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I. INTRODUCTION 
The name given to this effort is "transformation," …[to] think boldly 
and remake itself thoroughly, changing the way we: Train and equip 
our forces; Use them for combat, stability operations and otherwise; 
Position those forces around the world; Work with allies and 
partners; and Conduct procurement and other business activities.  
Douglas J. Feith 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 




A. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
The War on Terror is being waged on the soil of the world’s weaker 
nations.  Yet most of these governments are woefully unprepared to defend 
against the growing threat.  The purpose of this project is to assess Colombia’s 
efforts to transform their security forces to meet the current threat of terrorism, 
arms and drug trafficking, and human smuggling operations, in order that these 
lessons may assist future transformation attempts by other nations. 
Despite the emergence of diverse, decentralized threats over the past 15 
years, many of the world’s militaries remain structurally organized and equipped 
to wage the Cold War.  These legacy forces are proving ill equipped and poorly 
organized to effectively counter these growing challenges.  To date, scholarly 
attention has focused on efforts by the United States, United Nations, NATO and 
West European democracies to transform their military forces towards smaller, 
more agile and responsive forces without sacrificing security.   These concepts 
essentially reflect an intelligence-based, rapidly deployment force-type model, or 
IBRDF.  Undeterred, transnational terrorist organizations are increasingly 
establishing their presence in developing nations due to the limited penetration of 
the governments into the rural areas.  Despite this trend, little is known about the 




B. TRANSFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD – QUESTIONS 
AND ISSUES 
This thesis seeks to increase our knowledge about transformation in the 
developing world by examining Colombia’s recent efforts on this front.  
Discussion focuses on the appropriateness of the IBRDF model, the anticipated 
obstacles encountered by developing nations, and the appropriate role for the 
United States to play in the process. 
1. Is the IBRDF Appropriate for Developing Countries? 
Developing nations face enemies that are organizationally and 
technologically more advanced than in the past.  These international terrorist and 
criminal organizations are drawn to nations with weaker governmental institutions 
to enable them to conduct their business unimpeded.  Hence, these nations play 
a critical role in the War on Terror, as well as combating a host of other illicit 
activities.  Traditional forces and static methods have proven largely ineffective in 
combating these threats.  This thesis explores why the intelligence-based, rapid 
deployment force (IBRDF) transformation is proving to be effective against 
Colombia’s adversaries, yet the process, internal to Colombia, is a continuing 
struggle with an uncertain outcome. 
2. What Obstacles Await a Nation’s Transformation Effort? 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, transformation’s most ardent opponents 
are human factors such as corruption and resistance to change, more so than 
resource limitations.  In the case of Colombia, transformational change was 
evident before increased revenues had taken effect, indicating that resources 
and transformation do not share a cause-effect correlation.  Meanwhile the 
continued reality of opposition represents a threat to the long-term viability of 
transformation.  The way in which corruption and resistance negatively affect 
IBRDF transformation is examined further in this project. 
3. U.S. Policy—What Should It Be? 
U.S. aid for Colombia will approach US$4.4 billion (1997-2005) next year, 
yet the vast majority of those dollars remain narrowly focused on counterdrug 
missions rather than the comprehensive war they fight, despite supposed 
3 
Expanded Authority.1  This monograph offers recommended corrections for U.S. 
policy with regard to Colombia, as well as offering more general suggestions for 
future allied support to other nations, which might benefit from undertaking a 
process of transformation to an IBRDF model. 
 
C. TERMINOLOGY 
In order to create a common reference point, a five key terms used 
throughout this thesis warrant description or definition.   
1. Developing Nation 
A developing nation is broadly defined, in accordance with the United 
Nations’ definition, as simply a nation not yet developed.  The UN allows each 
nation to designate itself as undeveloped or developing. In general, these 
countries lack significant industrialization relative to their populations and share a 
low standard of living.  For the purpose of this project however, “developing 
nation” excludes the least developed countries (LDCs), which can in no sense be 
considered developing. 
2. Intelligence-Based, Rapid Deployment Force (IBRDF) 
The term IBRDF was chosen for its descriptive characteristics and while 
the term may seem unfamiliar in today’s trendy lexicon environment, the 
foundational concepts are not.  There exists no shortage of variants emphasizing 
similar capabilities: “Information-Based Force,” “Intelligence-Based Warfare,” 
“Integrated Operations, Logistics, Intelligence,” “Global Rapid Deployment 
Force,” “Sense-and-Respond,” “Rapid Decisive Operations,” and NATO’s 
“Integrated Event-Driven Rapid Deployment Force.”2  The essential elements of 
                                            
1 Center for International Policy—Colombia Program, U.S. Aid to Colombia Since 1997: 
Summary Tables, (February 20, 2004, available online: 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm, last accessed: September 18, 2004). 
2 Linda Lewandowski, “Sense and Respond Logistics: Co-Evolution of an Adaptive 
Enterprise Capability,” (presentation, Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, 
Washington D.C., available online: http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/briefing_ 
309_Lewandowski_ndia.pdf, last accessed: September 18, 2004). 
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an intelligence-based, rapid deployment force are intuitively to permit decision 
makers “to see first, understand first, act first, and win decisively.”3   
3. Legacy Force 
Legacy force, as utilized herein, refers to a security force, combined with 
its associated tangibles and intangibles (organizational structures, operating 
tactics, techniques and procedures, weaponry and culture) that represent a well-
established way of doing business.  In U.S. military terms, it refers to the 
practices and paradigms tied to the Cold War era.  More broadly, it implies the 
strict adherence to traditions, methods and technologies of the past, for both 
sound and unsound reasons. 
4. Narcoterrorism/Narcoterrorists 
Narcoterrorism is the calculated use of violent acts, tactics and methods 
(or the threat of their use) against civilians in order to attain goals that are 
political, ideological, or religious in nature, where such acts of violence, 
intimidation or coercion are financed by participation in the drug trade.  
Narcoterrorists are actors who engage in such activities.  This term most 
accurately depicts the complex entanglements of Illegally Armed Groups (IAG) 
and the activities in which they engage.   
5. Transformation 
It is more useful to describe than define transformation.  The term 
represents more than change; it demands a shift in mindset to the continual 
quest for new efficiencies and improvements.  More than mere adaptation of 
existing practices or thought, it challenges the very interpretation of current 
problem sets, and expects to open the door to new solutions.  In addition to 
Undersecretary Feith’s insight above, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
describes it as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition 
and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and 
organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our 
                                            
3 Robert W. Noonan Jr. and Brad T. Andrew, “Army Intelligence Provides the Knowledge 
Edge,” Army Magazine, (April 2002, online at: http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf, last 
accessed: September 18, 2004), p. 1. 
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asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin 
peace and stability in the world.”4   
While militaries in developing nations are unlikely to adopt the same high-
technology capabilities as the U.S. military during a process of transformation, 
the components of the process are still the same.  To illustrate, two hypothetical 
nations replace their 1940’s vintage truck fleet with 1990’s equipment.  The first 
changes only the vehicles.  The second nation, anticipating the vehicles’ new 
capabilities, recognizes and exploits them by changing how they are employed, 
the units to which they are assigned, determining new maintenance schedules to 
maximize utilization, and the like.  The first nation demonstrated modernization 
while the second nation exhibited the desired traits of transformation. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Colombia’s efforts to create an IBRDF serves as the case study for this 
project.  Colombia has struggled with many issues common to developing 
countries increasing the likelihood that “lessons learned” from the Colombian 
case will be applicable to the experiences of other developing nations.  Issues 
such as governmental corruption, poverty, insurgency, porous borders, terrorism 
and drug/arms trafficking activities are present in Colombia.   
Since the Colombian experience is very recent, it is difficult to obtain 
applicable scholarly information.  After action reports, interviews of advisors and 
Military Group members in Bogotá serve as a primary means of information.  
Regionally specific text, interviews conducted with Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (Western Hemisphere), U.S. Southern Command officials, and think 
tank organizations provided additional information for analysis and conclusions. 
 
 
                                            
4 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Fall 2003, 





Chapter II first describes the characteristics of the IBRDF model that is 
being adopted by security forces in many developed countries.  It next provides a 
general threat assessment that has evolved over the past several decades 
toward smaller, decentralized adversaries.  Third, the chapter shows why the 
U.S. military has deemed this model appropriate for export to many developing 
countries facing threats from non-state actors.  Fourth, the chapter presents both 
the dissenting opinions, critical of the IBRDF assumptions, as well as augments 
discounting those critics for use among developing nations.  (Chapter IV, which 
demonstrates the effectiveness of IBRDF in addressing the threat in Colombia, 
provides a rejoinder to the critics.)   
Chapter III uses Colombia as a case study to evaluate transformation 
within a developing nation.  The first section describes Colombia’s three principal 
threats as representative of the new threats facing developed and developing 
nations alike.  The next segment illustrates how Colombia’s legacy force was ill 
equipped to deal with the narcoterrorists.  The third section describes the 
adaptive military changes that occurred under President Andres Pastrana (1998-
2002) as adaptive, while President Alvaro Uribe (2002-present) oversaw true 
transformation.  This chapter highlights the conditions that made transformation 
possible in Colombia.  President Uribe’s determined and centralized leadership is 
the key to the change, as is the presence of a few moderately visionary military 
leaders.  While a long history of U.S. training of segments of the Colombian 
military and current U.S. guidance have facilitated the transformation process, 
Colombian leadership and financing have been the key. 
Chapter IV evaluates the extent to which the transformational process has 
been successful.  The first segment reflects the impressive impact of 
transformation on operations, security and enemy force operations.  However, 
the second portion of the chapter discloses four major obstacles threatening to 
derail continued progress, including cultural and corruption issues.  The third 
section reveals that Colombia’s current progress toward institutionalizing change 
remains uncertain beyond President Uribe’s tenure.   
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Chapter V highlights those applicable lessons with applicability for other 
developing nations considering a similar course of action.  The four findings are: 
the critical role of civilian leadership; the benefit of existing core competency; the 
importance of an obedient military leadership that either actively supports the 
reform or at least acquiesces to it; and the usefulness of foreign assistance in the 
form of education and training.  Corruption and the challenges of police-military 
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II. THE THREAT AND U.S. POLICY 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism 
and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and 
nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that 
occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a 
catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have 
declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these 
terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to 
harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all 
our power.  
President Bush 
West Point, New York 
June 1, 2002 
The 1990s represented limitless possibilities for the American security 
apparatus.  It promised peace and prosperity after the Cold War victory.  It also 
represented a time of emerging threats, uncertainty and redefinition.  This 
chapter serves three purposes.  First, it describes the emergence of the growing 
global threats and explains why the legacy forces of the Cold War era are ill-
equipped to defeat these adversaries.  Second, this chapter introduces the 
concepts of the IBRDF model, representing agile warfare better suited to defeat 
the threats described.  Finally, it explores the opposition to and support for the 
use of IBRDF among developing nations. 
As Pentagon officials considered a multitude of security issues, the 
conclusion of the Cold War effectively loosened the lid on order in many regions 
of the world.  What had been dismissively termed low intensity conflicts in the 
1980s, during the height of the Cold War, was re-coined military operations other 
than war (MOOTW) in the 1990s, and presented a likely indication of the 
foreseeable threat in a unipolar world.  As the number of crises expanded, similar 
characteristics became increasingly evident -- all of which tie to durability and 
lethality.  The successful groups in the post Cold War era have tended to follow 
four principles of durability.  First, groups emerging in the 1980s and 1990s have 
found success by decentralizing their organizations; utilizing a flat nodal or 
cellular structure to assist in blending in to society and avoid detection.  Second, 
10 
as state sponsorship declined, groups have become financially independent by 
establishing charity groups and/or becoming involved in illicit activities such as 
narcotics or arms smuggling, prostitution or human smuggling.  Rather than 
dissolve after the Soviet collapse, many actually expanded their coffers.  A third 
characteristic of their durability is the willingness to ally with other illegal or terror 
organizations to in a mutually beneficial arrangement.  More wealthy groups have 
shown a willingness to pay for expertise or technologically advanced weapons.  
The situation is further confused by a group’s involvement across the spectrum of 
traditional criminal, terrorist and insurgency activities.  In lieu of an updated 
lexicon, traditional labels assigned by U.S. policy makers fail to reflect reality, and 
groups successfully avoid international consensus and condemnation.  Finally, 
with the proliferation of technology and materials, groups can forgo recruiting and 
maintaining a large organization and still possess a horrific lethal capability.   
These organizational adaptations are coupled with an increased lethality 
enabled by technology and a desire to inflict increased destruction.  Their 
offensive operations become more effective by leveraging technology (internet, 
cell phones, remote triggering devices, global positioning devices), as well as 
circumventing state technology (closed/family networks, primitive smuggling 
methods, reliance on barter or cash transactions).  Lethality is increased by the 
years of perfecting tactics that ensure the greatest success rate with their limited 
resources.  While a multitude of bombing tactics are still the preferred means of 
violence, technology has raised its level of lethality to a new level.  While suicide, 
mortar, timed, and road-side bombs have existed for decades, there has been a 
proliferation of new methods such as rocket propelled grenades (RPG), shoulder-
fired missiles, remotely triggered and hostage (collar or bicycle) bombs.  
Targeting military personnel and installations, and government officials has given 
way to more carnage resulting from intentional civilian targeting and human 
shielding.  An increasing number of these groups are religiously motivated rather 




A. SECURITY THREATS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA   
Four categories of threats have captured the attention of strategists and 
military analysts above all others.  They include continued threat of insurgency, 
reinvigorated by financial independence, international terrorism, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crime.  As evident below, the 
continued trend is made more worrisome by the common nexus of these actors 
among several of these categories, leading to a blurring of traditional distinctions.  
Further, all four threat categories are represent to varying degrees in Colombia. 
Insurgency, the first of four global threats, reclaimed center stage in 
numerous countries, and is expected to hold a prominent role as a global threat 
to peace and security for the foreseeable future.  For the purpose of this project, 
insurgency is defined herein as any politically motivated campaign intended to 
replace an incumbent form of government, or at a minimum, secure significant 
influence within the existing system.  Unlike religious terrorism, its actors’ intend 
to invoke their own ideology absent any religious extremism. To illustrate the 
influence insurgency continues to hold, Albert Jongman of Leiden University 
Netherlands, and the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of Human 
Rights Violations (or its Dutch abbreviation PIOOM), provide impressive figures 
of the degree of impact resulting from insurgencies around the world.  They 
define high intensity conflicts (HICs) as those struggles resulting in over 1,000 
fatalities per year, low intensity conflicts (LICs) includes between 100 and 1,000 
deaths, and violent political conflicts (VPCs) as resulting in between 25 and 100 
deaths.  In contrast to the situation during the Cold War, sixteen of the seventeen 
HICs in 1997, qualify as insurgencies (Colombia, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Turkey, 
Kashmir, Burma, Burundi, Iraq, Assam, Bihar, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Congo-
Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, and Sudan.  The violence within the 
seventeenth nation, Albania, was the result of armed gangs rather than political 
aspirations.)5   
                                            
5 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (Frank Cass 
Publishers, Portland, 2000), p. 4. 
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The increases in both LICs and VPCs are dramatic since the Cold War, 
according to PIOOM, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  This trend is strongest in Latin 
America, Africa and Central Asia, which suffer the majority of insurgency wars.  
Of 1997’s LICs, all but three described intrastate conflicts.  The serious nature of 
the LICs and VPCs should not be underestimated.  Although the number killed as 
part of the direct insurgent effort is does not grab the headlines, large numbers of 
numbers of victims fall prey to forced displacement, poverty and disease.  More 
disturbing is the estimate that as many as 84 percent of those killed in LICs since 
1945 are not combatants, but civilians.  According to International Red Cross 
(ICRC) figures, the number of LIC and VPCs has increased in recent years from 
an average of 20-25 annually to 65-70.  Additionally, the number of people 
affected by them is increasing by a factor of 10 million annually for the next few 
years.6  
 1995 1996 1997
High Intensity Conflicts 20 19 17 
Low Intensity Conflicts 39 42 70 
Violent Political Conflicts 40 75 74 
Total 99 136 161 
Figure 2.1 Three-year Survey of Global Conflicts 
(From Reference: Paul Wilkinson) 
 
When properly led and equipped, guerrilla warfare has long been an 
effective method of manipulating government policy makers, affecting economic 
performance and tying down large numbers of security forces.  However, the 
absence of the Soviet bloc has led to definite changes in the nature of the 
guerrilla threat and the ability of the government to respond. As funding was lost 
and priorities shifted, national leaders found themselves forced to contend with 
the domestic and regional strife largely on their own.  Similarly, the once-
subsidized leftist groups were forced to adapt to the sudden loss of support or 
fade away.  Insurgency organizations have found innovative means of generating 
necessary funds, while new organizations have added to the violence.  Groups 
collaborating with each other, establishing or deepening ties with organized crime 
                                            
6 Ibid. 
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despite previous ideological barriers or are engaging in illicit activity themselves.   
(cite examples of TBA, al Qaeda and Hezbollah) 
Groups will continue to adapt and innovate in order to maintain some 
measure of support (or tolerance) from the grass-root populace, proportional to 
their need for recruits, funding and freedom of action.  For those groups who 
must rely more heavily on public sympathy and financial contributions, success 
depends on its ability to string strategically relevant operations together in order 
to win popular support, increase solidarity while enticing governmental over 
reaction.  Since this task is quite difficult, we can expect to see the rapid 
emergence and fall of new groups; one-hit wonders if you will.   
From an effects-based approach, it is increasingly meaningless to attempt 
to differentiate between insurgency and terrorism as the end result of their violent 
tactics and indiscriminate targeting of civilians are identical.  The predominant 
emerging form of insurgency is ethnic or ethno-religious in its underlying 
purpose.  Intrastate ethnic or ethno-religious violence has the potential to 
develop into the most dangerous situation because of its inherent ability to 
mobilize quickly and escalate out of control.   
International and religious terrorism represents a second principal 
threat to national security.  As with insurgency, terrorism is an old game with 
some new rules.  Terrorism refers to the acts of violence against a society in 
order to coerce or intimidate, as well as implying an organized movement that 
employs such methods of violence to achieve its political or ideological agenda.  
The latter implies terrorist groups with strategic methodology and goals to 
challenge state authority and legitimacy.  However, it is important to point out that 
the former definition includes the violent actions of governments themselves, 
state-sponsored groups, or pro-government paramilitary forces who inflict 
violence on its own people or the citizens of rival states.   
The following lessons of history offer beneficial insight into the 
evolutionary process of what global terror has evolved to this point.  The first 
category, the “anarchist wave” (1880’s-1925), was made possible by leveraging 
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new technology.  The revolution in communications and transportation patterns 
enabled the widespread reproduction and distribution of its written ideology.  
Common methods of terror included assassination campaigns and used frequent 
bank robberies as source of funding.  The “anti-colonial wave” (1920s-1960), 
sought to target police so as to entice a government to employ its heavy-handed 
military.  This force often overreacted to terrorist attacks, causing a backlash of 
public condemnation, which advanced the terrorist cause more than the original 
act of terror.  The third wave, “new left” (1960s-1990), in contrast combined anti-
West and nationalism to spark revolutions in around the world.  The term 
international terrorism was revived as different groups cooperated with one 
another.  The defeat of the U.S. in the Vietnam War and the rise of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were high points of this wave.  Airline 
hijackings were used to gain international attention, and kidnappings were found 
a successful means of financing.7   
In contrast to previous waves, Rapoport asserts the current “religious 
wave” (1979-present) has produced organizations with a higher level of 
recruitment and purpose than in previous waves.  Although all major religions as 
well as cults are involved in terrorist events, Islam is the most key religion in this 
movement.  The Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan 
(1979-89), and the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut (1982) have emboldened Islamic 
extremists in the belief that they can create a single Islamic state and regain 
former glory.  Another hallmark of this wave is the deliberate targeting of military 
and government installations of both foreign and domestic states.8  Religious 
terrorists, unlike those of the new left or anti-colonial waves do not seek rewards 
on earth, such as state concessions and political influence.  Followers instead 
seek to honorably endure adversity so as to be pleasing before God, and thereby 
receive eternal rewards.  This religious conviction not only gives them strength 
but also interprets any move towards moderation as treasonous.   
                                            
7 David W. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” in The New 
Global Terrorism; Characteristics, Causes and Controls, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed. (Prentice 
Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2003), pp. 36-44. 
8 Ibid. 
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The take-away of this cursory overview of history is that organizations 
adapt and learn from successful predecessors, just as states adapt to defeating 
these groups.  The tactics employed today emphasize the most deadly variations 
of bombing, kidnapping, taking of hostages, arson, assault, and hijacking. 
Numerous other sub-categories of terrorism receive less press, but the potential 
effects are equally horrific, such as agricultural and nanoterrorism.   Innovations 
include the use of the internet as a breakthrough method of spreading a 
message to the masses, just as the first wave used newspapers and 
transportation.  Contemporary groups continue to frustrate states, causing them 
to overreact, as in the second wave.  Unparalleled cooperation between terrorist 
organizations is also working to challenge efforts to counter these groups.  State 
sovereignty issues and international laws have not evolved as quickly as terror 
groups have exploited these deficiencies.   
Other analysts differentiate the terrorism seen in the 1990s as uniquely set 
apart from earlier decades.  Determined leadership, innovatively organized to 
maximize survivability and lethality, exemplified in the al Qaeda structural model.  
Rather than the traditionally hierarchical command structure, it has instead opted 
to utilize a flat, decentralized structure.  These cells depend on the autonomous 
and stealthy nature of the group for survival and lethality.  Prior to September 11, 
2001, al Qaeda was reportedly located in over 60 nations.  They seized upon 
inefficiencies in U.S. intelligence gathering and detection systems, facilitated by 
steady globalization trends; open markets, frequent business travel, and lax U.S. 
customs tracking.  Since 9-11, over 2,000-suspected operatives have been 
apprehended while many more disappeared.  It must be expected that the 
surviving organization is morphing once again into a more loosely affiliated 
network, pushing more authority and resources to local levels.  Like a virus, 
terrorists groups either die or mutate in order to survive.  When not completely 
eradicated we should expect the return of a different, more resilient and resistant 
form.  Al Qaeda’s centers of gravity, as with many of the religious terrorist 
groups,  lies  in  its: a)  reputation  as  effectively able to hit a common enemy;  2)  
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effective leadership; 3) finances in order to conduct operations, welfare efforts, 
both of which serve recruiting propaganda purposes; and 4) global presence able 
to exert force anywhere.9 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation represents the third 
category of increasing threats which can be further broken into two areas of 
concern; state versus non-state acquisition.  A state’s decision to pursue 
chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) weapons is generally 
motivated by the rational evaluation of its self-interest.  These interests may 
originate from the perceived need of defensive or offensive purposes, to raise 
national status equal to other have nations, to resist being pressured, or possibly 
the intent to market the technology to would-be buyers.  U.S. policy makers 
wishing to identify which motives apply can infer based upon the doctrine, launch 
authorities, safety measures and perceived threats of various nations’ CBRN 
armament.  For example, North Korea appears to view their arsenal in an 
offensive, integrated manner, while Israel views nuclear weapons as weapons of 
last resort, going so far as to not include them in any wartime operational plans.10  
Other nuclear states of interest include Pakistan and India both of which tested 
nuclear weapons in 1998, and which continue to engage in confrontations with 
the other (e.g. May 1998, March 2003).  Pakistan’s security is also a point of 
concern, as Dr. Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, father of the Islamic bomb, was 
exposed for selling nuclear technologies to North Korea, Iran and Libya.  
Concern over Russia’s stockpile security, accountability and destruction 
programs has existed since the Cold War’s end, but the desire of state and non-
state actors to obtain such technology has heightened the anxiety. 
The acquisition of CBRN by non-state actors poses a greater concern due 
to the belief that terrorists would expend valuable resources and expose 
themselves to high risk only if they intended to use the weapons, either to 
blackmail a state(s) or deliberately detonate a device(s) for the purpose of killing 
                                            
9 Brian M. Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda: an Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions 
for Strategy (Rand, Santa Monica CA, 2002), pp. 6-15. 
10 Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca NY, 2000), p. 233. 
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tens of thousands.  Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult foreshadowed, in their partially 
successful 1995 sarin attack, what other groups such as al Qaeda would like to 
accomplish on a much larger scale.  In the 1970s, tens died in the worst terrorist 
incidents, hundreds in the 1980’s and 1990s, and thousands in the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  If successfully employed, WMD provides terrorists a viable 
means to increase the death rate once again to tens of thousands.  The coalition 
operations in Afghanistan revealed al Qaeda’s aspirations to acquire chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons.   
Fears of bio-terrorist attacks turned to reality when a perpetrator sent 
anthrax-laden letters to target recipients in the news media and government.  
While the timing of this series of events caused many to suspect al Qaeda, no 
evidence directly tied it to these attacks.  The proliferation of science and genetic 
engineering has made existing biological agents even more potent, infectious, 
and dangerous than before.  Variations include the manufacturing of new strains 
and cocktails combining different agents present further complications for first 
responders.  Additionally, an outbreak can be masked for some time in order to 
multiply its effects.  Devastating attacks need not be waged by complex 
organizations any longer.  Individual actors, such as Ted Kaczynski, or very small 
groups, such as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, are much more difficult to 
detect, adding a layer of complexity to security.  Enabled by technology and 
communication, an unprecedented amount of destruction can be levied by only 
one or two individuals, whether motivated by ideology or greed.   
Transnational crime, a fourth principal threat, is comprised of numerous 
illicit activities, including narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, money 
laundering, and the like.  A traditional view of crime has described it as a 
parasite, feeding off the host (nation), but not intending to destroy it, whereas 
terrorist and insurgents represent the lethal threat as they wish to bring about 
total destruction of the host (nation).  While the primary results of crime may 
support such an assertion, the second and third order effects on society, 
government, judicial process, linkages to clandestine organizations described 
above and similar crippling effects clearly lead to a degeneration of a state’s 
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ability to fulfill its legitimate governing roles.  The immediate byproducts of crime 
breed corruption of governmental officials, violence and instability on society, 
forfeiture of economic investment and development, and increased black 
marketeering which bypasses taxation.    
From a U.S. strategic perspective, the proliferation of transnational crime 
can effectively nullify the desired effects of State Department assistance and 
Defense Department engagement programs.  If allowed to deteriorate, the United 
States can lose a strategic ally, denying us of another critical access point.    
Once corruption gains a foothold within government, a common cycle of a failed 
state begins that is difficult to break.  Corruption erodes a state’s legitimacy, 
further accelerated as lost revenue and investment prevents the delivery the 
goods and services expected by its population.  Its failure to deliver goods and 
security widens the social fissures between government and citizens, and 
provides an opportunity for terrorists, insurgents or criminals to build a larger 
constituency.  A failing state typically responds by entrenching itself rather than 
reaching out to its populace, causing further isolation.  Somewhere in the cycle, a 
state becomes unable to combat the issues of corruption and judicial failures.  
Their focus turns to self-preservation just as their citizens need protection from 
the predatory tactics of these criminals.  Caribbean, Latin American and African 
nations experience far more lives lost annually due to criminal violence than are 
lost waging terrorist or insurgency attacks, not to mention the crippling effects of 
crime on the economy.11   
Motivated by greed, criminal groups have successfully adapted to the 
changing environment as well.  One such innovation is the increased cooperation 
and synergistic relationship forged between criminal groups and terrorist and/or 
insurgency groups.  The tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina 
illustrates this mixture of interests.  Lebanese, Hong Kong, Korean and Chinese 
                                            
11 Andrew Morrison, Mayra Buvinic and Michael Shifter, “The Violent Americas: Risk Factors, 
Consequences, and Policy Implications of Social and Domestic Violence,” in Hugo Fruhling, 
Joseph S. Tulchin, and Heather A. Golding, Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen 
Security, Democracy and the State, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C., 2003), pp. 
96-114. 
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mafias are among the seventeen criminal groups present, in addition to six 
Islamic radical groups (IRGs; Hamas, Hizbollah, al Qaeda, Al-Jihad, Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya, and al-Muqawamah).  At stake is an annual average of US$12 
billion in money laundering alone as of 2001.  The symbiotic relationship drives 
the groups to capitalize on the joint efforts of drug and arms smuggling, 
contraband, product piracy, and the like in a virtual lawless land. 12  This 
cooperation ensures all parties benefit to some degree.  It is estimated that the 
collective gain of the IRGs is between US$300-500 million per year. Similar 
arrangements are being forged Europe, Africa and Asia.13  
The increasing sophistication is further complicated by the ability of these 
groups to exploit gaps in state sovereignty regions, border disputes, and lack of 
progress in international law or consensus to combat these threats.  However, 
even if international law matured and states cooperated to diplomatically close 
these opportunities, the large Cold War-era security force structures remain 
woefully mismatched against these smaller, decentralized forces.   
 
B. LEGACY FORCE INADEQUACIES 
Prominent officials, including two consecutive Central Intelligence 
Directors (DCI), James Woolsey (1994) and John Deutsch (1996), warned of a 
new era of terrorism far more lethal and bloody than before.  However, these 
predictions failed to materialize in a timely manner.  To the contrary, the numbers 
of U.S. citizens killed in the 1990s sharply dropped off to 87 (in 1,372 attacks 
against U.S. targets), as opposed to 571 killed in the 1980s (in 1,701 such 
attacks).14  This was hardly the statistical evidence required to build a consensus 
for increased budgetary allocations.  Instead, there was a decrease in 
intelligence operative and analyst positions.  Compared to the familiarity of the 
                                            
12 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of 
South America,” (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, July 2003), pp. 1-20. 
13 Tamara Makarenko, “On the Border of Crime and Insurgency,” Jane’s International 
Review (January 1, 2002, posted December 18, 2001, last viewed March 3, 2004), pp 1-3. 
14 Bruce Hoffman, “Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy,” (RAND 
Testimony, Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relation, House Committee on Government Reform, March 27, 2001), p. 4. 
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Soviet opponent, the United States lacked the detailed intelligence on these new 
foes, operating under “elusive banners such as the Red Army Faction, the Red 
Brigades, the Armed Forces of the National Liberation, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces, and the Revolutionary War of the People, the Popular Front, and the 
Holy War.”15   
Organized in nodes and cells, groups successfully eluded capture by both 
blending into communities and dispersing to austere locations.  They gained 
strength as the narcotics industry boomed, religious extremism and anti-West 
sentiments accelerated, and further perfected the decentralized, elusive and 
unconventional force model.  The legacy forces forged during the Cold War, the 
mass tanks, ships and infantry formations, proved poorly matched against their 
asymmetric tactics.  Instead of pitched battles for air and sea supremacy, 
societies watched the execution of hostages, bombing of embassies, 
assassinations of officials, and hijackings of airliners replayed in the headlines.   
America was also involved in conflicts in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and 
Kosovo, concurrent with the decade-long Northern and Southern Watch missions 
during the 1990s.  Apart from the conventional-style Gulf War, the world’s 
premier military was ill prepared, reactionary, and awkward.  Lacking decisive 
military objectives in these austere conflicts, defensive policies emphasized force 
preservation and victory was left undefined.  Pentagon officials, who had 
previously resisted the entanglements of open-ended, nation-building missions, 
progressively realized that their legacy force was inappropriate to contend with 
the reality of emerging threats.  The changing world and civilian leadership 
required the creation of a relevant arsenal for the coming century.  The revolution 
in military affairs (RMA) was initiated during the first half of the 1990s, as DOD 
commissioned numerous think tanks to recommend transformational concepts 
able to meet the changing environment.  As Andrew Krepinevich concluded in 
1999, such “support has not been translated into a defense program supporting 
                                            
15 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism and the Other World War,” in the New Global 
Terrorism; Characteristics, Causes and Controls, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Prentice Hall, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, 2003), p. 15. 
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transformation…Thus one can only conclude that, in the absence of a strong 
external shock to the U.S. defense establishment, surmounting the barriers to 
transformation will likely prove a long, arduous process.”16  On September 11, 
2001, the shock came and rocked the entrenched mindsets and institutions; 
doctrine, war plans, funding and acquisition programs, troop strength and basing.  
The need to correct deficiencies in intelligence and response became the focus 
of this next phase of transformation.    
European and NATO forces encountered similar challenges as they 
attempted to redefine themselves in light of the new environment.  In response, 
European nations experimented with varying strategic-level responses, such as 
punishing state sponsors through economic sanctions, discrediting them 
diplomatically, sharing intelligence information with other nations, and 
employment of military force.  Lacking a unified international effort, nations 
experienced mixed results. 
Developing nations also struggled to identify the correct role for their 
militaries, amidst various histories and civil-military relations issues.  In 1992, for 
example, Argentina concluded very little threat existed internally or externally.  
The Ecuadorian military, on the other hand, was charged with preparing for not 
only internal and external threats, but also contribute to the nation’s 
socioeconomic development, in accordance with the 1978 Constitution.17  From 
the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the frustration felt by Colombian national forces in 
an effort to defeat their insurgency manifested itself through numerous 
accusations of human rights abuses by government forces and/or their tacit 
consent of paramilitary violence.  
 
 
                                            
16 Andrew Krepinevich, “Why No Transformation?” The National Interest (February 4, 1999, 
available from: http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/A.19990204.Why_No_ 
Transformat/A.19990204.Why_No_Transformat.htm, accessed 9 August 2004), p. 7. 
17 J. Samuel Fitch, Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore MD, 1998), pp. 117-119. 
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C. UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLIGENCE BASED RAPID 
DEPLOYMENT FORCE (IBRDF) CONCEPT 
In response to the new threat environment of the post Cold War era, the 
U.S. military began a process of transformation in the 1990s that has only 
accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Efforts to 
transform endured a flurry of concepts and titles.  Once referred to as Joint 
Contingency Force Operations, the multifaceted Rapid Decisive Operations 
(RDO) concept has survived the test of time in an evolution of change.  It 
articulates perfecting of several ideals, which if accomplished would be truly 
transformational.   
Rapid Decisive Operations is a concept for future joint operations. 
A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, command and 
control, and operations to achieve the desired political/military 
effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive operation, 
the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments 
of national power to understand and reduce the adversary’s critical 
capabilities and coherence. The United States and its allies 
asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in 
dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms 
and tempo of the operation. The adversary, suffering from loss of 
coherence, operational capabilities, and unable to achieve his 
objectives, ceases actions that are against US interests or has his 
capabilities defeated.18  
In sum, RDO requires unprecedented preparation of a battle space 
through intelligence, leading to the offensive, precise attacks on the enemy’s 
critical nodes, putting him permanently on his heels until defeated or his will to 
fight is broken.  The two cornerstones of RDO rely first on acquiring reliable, 
actionable intelligence, and secondly the capability to respond immediately.  The 
implications equate to improvements in air, land and sea maneuverability, 
communications, precision munitions, detection, and formation of more lethal and 
agile forces.   
 
                                            
18 Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper, United States Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM), J9 Joint Futures Lab, Final Draft (version 2.0), (October 25, 2001, available at 
https://www.daml.org/2002/01/experiment/RDO_White_Paper.pdf, accessed 4 August 2004), p. 
11.   
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The Role of Intelligence.  As General Peter Pace was fond of saying while 
Commander of U.S. Southern Command, “Intelligence drives ops.”  Intelligence 
efforts are fundamentally designed to fulfill two roles.  First, in the traditional 
sense, it strives to provide information superiority, and ultimately decision 
superiority to senior officials.  The ability to collect, process, evaluate, and 
integrate this information not only provides leaders with offensive lethality, but 
also strengthens defensive and deterrence.  Deliberately planned and executed 
offensive maneuvers are designed to overwhelm and incapacitate the enemy 
long enough to accomplish the desired effects.  Policy makers may also leverage 
superior intelligence to gain non-violent options of targeting the legitimacy of 
enemy by manipulating or negating underlying factors of support and recruitment. 
The second role of intelligence is maximized by pushing information to 
lower levels.  Intelligence is no longer reserved for top-level commanders for 
incorporation into strategic or operational plans.  Instead, when fed directly to the 
users, it provides specific indicators at specific times in order to shape the 
battlefield at all levels, including tactical levels.  Enlightened with intelligence, 
operators can choose the time, location, method, then tailor a strike package to 
hit an enemy’s critical points.   
The Role of Rapid Deployment.  Intelligence superiority without the ability 
to rapidly respond to perishable commodity is useless.  Rapid mobility provides 
both offensive and defense advantages.  Offensively, speed and agility combine 
the long-standing principles of war--offense, mass, maneuver, economy of force 
and surprise, affording operators the capability to immediately strike time-
sensitive opportunities and deny the enemy space and time to recover.19   From 
a defensive perspective, rapid mobility denies the enemy a certainty of 
knowledge that a situation is as it appears.  Reinforcements can appear without 
warning, and overwhelming force is selectively applied rather than isolated, 
disbursement of assets.  
                                            
19 “Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces,” Joint Pub 1, (National Defense University Press 
November 11, 1991), p. 21. 
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Synergy.  Finally, it is essential to combine both intelligence and speed in 
order to gain the necessary synergy required defeat this new enemy; to deny the 
enemy sanctuary, surprise, and the ability to survive.  The desired effect is to 
inflict casualties to their belligerents and intolerable pressure on their 
organization to such a degree they are unable to survive.  Adversarial leaders 
are expected to make mistakes when under extreme pressure for an extended 
time, revealing weaknesses ripe for exploitation.  Rand analyst, David 
Ochmanek, wrote that one of the essential lessons learned in past 
counterinsurgency efforts is the need to apply “relentless” pressure on the 
groups.  When applied for extended periods of time, insurgents are forced to turn 
their efforts from planning strategic attacks to basic evasion and survival.  IBRDF 
is designed to for just that purpose. 
 
D. CRITIQUES OF IBRDF 
Critics of the IBRDF model generally focus on several assumptions 
required for its success, four of which are addressed below.  The first assumption 
implies future threats will be conducive to quick, decisive options.  The one-size-
fits-all legacy force repeatedly failed to provide policy makers with viable force 
options from the 1960s through the 1980s.  The reality of recent decades 
indicates peacekeeping, peacemaking and other longer-term conflicts will 
continue as prominent DoD missions for the foreseeable future.  The 
overwhelming U.S. technology in Iraq, for example, is helping to win battles but 
the strategic objectives can only be achieved through extended presence and 
force application across a broad spectrum.  Similarly, a policy of gradual 
escalation was selected in Kosovo in order to retain the international coalition 
and cause Slobodan Milosevic to acquiesce.  Critics assert, the assumption that 
future operations will be decisive is poorly conceived.    
The second assumption may well be the Achilles heel in presuming to 
possess near-certain knowledge of all potential enemies; sufficient to anticipate 
and act any time, any place.  Both technologies and human intelligence have 
disappointed thus far.  Thirdly, the model assumes that the adversary possesses 
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identifiable critical nodes that are defeated with a few well-placed strikes.  History 
clearly points to the difficulty of one nation correctly identifying which elements 
are in fact critical, and then effectively targeting them.  Finally, critics question the 
ability to consistently combine and focus national power in a manner that is both 
rapid and decisive.   
These arguments are arguably valid for developed nations, especially a 
hegemonic nation such as the United States who must stand ready to respond to 
global events.  However, they are much less applicable to most developing 
nations. In fact, if a developing nation that is progressing technologically, the 
IBRDF evidence appears favorable.  Even RDO critics acknowledge the 
overwhelming potential in operations that are viewed as high-end, smaller scale 
contingency operations such as Operations Urgent Fury (1983, Grenada), Just 
Cause (1988, Panama), and Uphold Democracy (1994, Haiti), and as well as 
larger conventional situations such as Operation Desert Storm (1991, 
Iraq/Kuwait).20   
Taking the points one-by-one, the developing nation is not concerned with 
preparing a diverse global response strategy for an unknown enemy.  Rather, it 
is generally familiar with its adversary, which tends to be an external state 
neighbor, in cases of border disputes, or internal threats of terrorism, crime, 
and/or insurgency.  
Second, narrowing the possible adversaries to a potential few allows even 
unsophisticated nations to maintain detailed knowledge of key leadership, orders 
of battle, and the like.  Parties commonly share a cultural similarity which adds 
further insight into critical nodes and decision processes, addressed in the third 
objection.  Finally, critics are specifically addressing the United States when 
discussing the difficulty in mobilizing or focusing national assets in light of global 
commitments.  It is reasoned that a developing nation, lacking extensive 
international entanglements, is able to consolidate its forces on the threat at 
                                            
20 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Rapid Decisive Operations;  Assumption-Based Critique (Strategic 
Studies Institute, November 2001, ISBN 1-58487-073-7, available from: http:// 
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hand.  Whether the nation feels threatened is a matter beyond IBRDF.  










III. COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCE TRANSFORMATION 
This ain’t no Vietnam.  I wish it were; it would be easier.21 
Gen (R) Charles Wilhelm, USMC 
Former Commander, U.S. Southern Command 
June 2000 
 
What a difference a few key people and a couple years make.  Security 
threat assessments have significantly improved since 2001, when the theme of 
many Latin America reports trumpeted Colombia’s imminent paralysis, if not 
complete failure.  This chapter tells the story of the Colombian military’s near 
defeat in the mid-1990s and its return from the brink in the years since.  The first 
section describes Colombia’s three principal threats as representative of the new 
threats facing developed and developing nations alike.  The next segment 
illustrates how Colombia’s legacy force was ill equipped to deal with the new 
challenges posed by these threats in the mid-1990s.  The third section shows 
how the military began to adapt under President Pastrana (1998-2002), but truly 
only entered a period of transformation under President Uribe (2002-present). 
 
A. COLOMBIAN THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Convincing military defeats and the slaughter of national police outposts in 
the countryside foretold the coming failure of the region’s oldest democracy.  “A 
[1998] Defense Intelligence Agency study warned that if nothing changed, FARC 
could take over the country in five years.”22  The three groups below represent a 
long and intricately woven past, too complex to unravel in the space allowed.  
Readers should resist narrowly categorizing any group as purely ideological or 
wholly profit oriented.  Just as FARC/ELN or AUC members participate in the 
narcotics trade to varying degrees, there are those drug operatives who share 
ties with either left or rightwing group.   
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Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2003), p. 206. 
22 Dana Priest, p. 211. 
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1. FARC 
Colombia’s illegally armed groups (IAG) are typically divided into three 
categories. The left side of the spectrum, termed simply as insurgents or 
guerrillas, are principally comprised by the FARC (15,000-18,000-strong), but 
also include the much smaller National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional, or ELN; 5,000-6,000-strong), and remnants of the Popular Liberation 
Army (EPL), the April 19 Movement (M-19), Worker's Self-Defense (ADO), and 
the Worker's Revolutionary Party (PRT).   
FARC members trace their roots back to the Marquetalia Raid of 1964, 
where 16,000 government troops massacred a community of 1,000, of which less 
than 50 were armed.23  This peasant Communist movement formally established 
the FARC in 1966, but was of little concern to most Colombians.  The conflict 
remained confined to the sparsely populated rural regions, and the 75% urban 
population expected the Colombian Army (COLAR) to keep these groups in 
check and away from their daily life. 
Organizationally, the FARC successfully adapted and innovated in 
response to many challenges.  Adhering to Maoist strategy, they adapted by 
utilizing the southeastern savannah and jungle as refuge, and then cultivated a 
mass peasant support base in the disenfranchised rural portions of the country.24  
They regrouped and gained attention as their numbers grew.  In 1982, those who 
advocated capitalizing on the narcotics revenues finally overcame those who 
warned against its corrupting influence.  Once this ideological barrier was 
removed, taxation measures, and later direct involvement, wielded the resources 
and power necessary to demand national attention.  This 1982 decision literally 
paid dual dividends.  First, it provided financial independence, insulating them 
from potential effects of the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union.  Second, they 
were ideally poised to exploit market opportunities when the Cali and Medellin 
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Cartels fell in the early-to-mid 1990s.25   In 1982, the FARC comprised of only 15 
fronts and only 2,000 fighters.  Marking their rapid growth, they expanded to 43 
fronts and approximately 5,000 fighters by 1990.  By 2002, they had continued to 
grow to 66 fronts.26  The key reason for this rapid expansion “was the 
development of a stable and lucrative source of financing its activities –the drug 
trade—by extracting protection money from coca grower and the operators of 
clandestine landing fields and laboratories, along with kidnapping.”27 
“By late 1998, the main rebel groups – the FARC and the ELN – were well 
financed and equipped by hundreds of small cartels that had sprung up in 1993 
after Escobar was killed.”28  Estimates of narcotics-related revenue generated for 
the guerrillas vary widely.  One Institute for National Strategic Studies report 
published in 1997, estimated between US$500 million to $1.5 billion in annual 
income.  A subsequent report estimated the drug-related income as low as 
US$30-$100 million, but most reports settle on the US$400-$600 million per year 
figure.29  Colombian officials estimate that drug-related income represents 
approximately half of their total revenue, with kidnapping ransoms, robberies, 
and extortion methods completing the difference.  What began as an insignificant 
ideological group, by the mid-1990s, had gradually created numerous base areas 
and totaled approximately 16,500 combatants (plus another 8,000-10,000 local 
militia members), capable of executing coordinated mobility warfare.30   
The lowering of the ideological standard came with a price as well, which 
has set the two key centers of gravity, financial independence and public support, 
at odds with each other.  For several FARC bloques, the focus on generating 
revenue has eclipsed the traditional advancement of Marxist ideology, thereby 
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leading to the atrophy of its political structure.  It has permitted the vicious killing 
of innocent peasants – the very people it set out to liberate – in an attempt to 
expand their influence.  In other words, the often corrupt and repressive guerrillas 
have simply replaced the corrupt and repressive officials of the La Violencia 
period.     
For the purpose of this project, it is necessary to evaluate the FARC 
organization against the effectiveness and strengths of the IBRDF model.  
Considering the FARC from a structural perspective, the organization follows a 
definite hierarchical model.  Their commander, Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias 
Tirofijo or “Sureshot,” leads the organization.  A seven-member secretariat 
coordinates strategic control, and each member is dual-hatted as the leader of 
one of the seven large, regional bloques.  The secretariat reports to the Estado 
Mayor Central, or central command, comprised of 25 members (assigned 
number varies).  Using a legitimate corporation analogy, “Tirofijo” is the CEO; the 
secretariat acts as the board of directors, while the central command represents 
the shareholders.  Under each bloque, several fronts exist (66-67 in total) to 
execute local operations.31   Under each front is a commission (which exercises 
control over the local militia), a mobile company (representing the fronts personal 
offensive arm), and at least two columns.  Each column is finally divided into two 
companies.  Militias (under commission control) serve intelligence, propaganda, 
logistics functions, as well as carry out extortion and financing racquets.  It is 
believed that members have infiltrated many government and military offices.  
Company guerrillas are uniformed members likely to carry out roadblocks for 
kidnapping targets, or launch attacks on civilian and/or government forces.  The 
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Figure 3.1 FARC Organizational Structure 
(After Reference:  Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency) 
 
The fronts are both self-sufficient and contributing to the hierarchy of the 
organization.  The various fronts and bloques play different roles within the 
overall organization.  Each employs different revenue generating methods based 
on geography, population and opportunity.  Bloques located near highways or 
populations rely more heavily on kidnappings and extortion, whereas areas that 
are more rural tend to rely more on the drug related activities.     
Many FARC fronts are well equipped with high-powered firearms (AK-47s, 
AKMs, Galils, and FALs), heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades 
(PRGs), mortars, explosives (C-4), chemical weapons, and likely possess 
shoulder-fired missiles or manpads, while others carry outdated or barely-
serviceable weapons. 32  However, the rapid growth in manpower and revenue 
provided the means to escalate methods of warfare.   
However, the FARC was almost eradicated in the late 1960s, when the 
government of Colombia (GOC) and the U.S. forces successfully prosecuted the 
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Marxist insurgency, severely weakening the organization. 33  Short of complete 
resolution, the ruling class abrogated management of the insurgency to the 
military with the expectation to keep the guerrillas from affecting urban life, which 
they generally succeeded in doing.  Over a 40-year generation, Colombians 
became accustom to the pain of this unpleasant-but-removed conflict.  The cities 
provided a barrier for three-quarters of the population, including the wealthy elite.  
The proverbial walls caused a sense of security that arguably still exists today for 
much of the political elite.  This is evident in the 2002 elections, where neither of 
the two established political parties campaigned on the issue of facing the 
insurgency as a war.  Rather, an independent candidate won an unprecedented 
landslide victory because the general population identified with his message to 
confront and end the conflict.   
Battlefield Victories.  On December 21, 1997, 100-200 guerrillas attacked 
an Army platoon defending their communications base atop Patascoy Hill.  
Surprise, mobility and mass combined to easily overwhelm the conscript force, 
killing 11 and capturing 18.  However, the battle of El Billar (February 26 – 3 
March 1998), pitted three companies (153 men) of the 52nd Counterguerrilla 
battalion of the newly formed 3rd Mobile Brigade (3 BRIM) against the FARC.  
They were ordered to disrupt 450 massing guerrillas.  Rather than scatter, the 
FARC set up a ‘U’-shaped ambush and succeeded in luring them in.  A second 
perimeter was established to defeat any reinforcing attempts by the COLAR.  For 
the last four days the troops were assaulted and reinforcements repelled.  The 
FARC claimed to have killed 80 troops and captured 43 others.34   
The FARC mobilized a nation-wide campaign in coordination with the 
ELN, concurrent with the August 1998, elections.  Over 42 attacks occurred in 
the first week, across 14 of the nation’s departments.  Guerrillas demonstrated 
the ability to mass five fronts (1,200 troops) against two targets simultaneously at 
Joaquin Paris Battalion and the co-located police base at Miraflores, Guaviare.  
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Attacks at La Uribe (three fronts, or 800 guerrillas) and Pavorando, (two fronts, or 
600 fighters), sent a clear message that the FARC were capable of attacking 
small to medium sized fortifications and could match the government forces boot-
to-boot in open combat.35  New FARC methods also demonstrated a confidence 
to fight above the horizon rather than their previous hit-and-run, guerrilla-style 
warfare.  At the conclusion of that single week, 143 members of the security 
forces were dead and over 130 more were captured.36   
With the FARC summarily striking at will, the rural peasants responded.  
“Ergo, we find ourselves back at the autodefensas, who – authorized or no, legal 
or not – have filled the gap and engaged in some of the most vicious fighting 
against FARC (and ELN).”37   
2. AUC 
The FARC’s opponents on the right of the spectrum are numerous 
paramilitary organizations, loosely affiliated with one another under the AUC 
umbrella (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia).  Now touting 20,000 members, the AUC is growing at a rate much 
faster than the FARC, quadrupling in size since 1998.38  Their rapid growth 
began in the late 1990s, which coincided with FARC successes against 
government forces, arguably contributing to their rapid growth.  First, when the 
government demonstrates its inability to deal with the guerrilla problem those 
with much to lose (wealthy land owners) actively mobilize the peasant population 
either out of fear and/or opportunity to balance the left-wing success.  Fear of 
guerrilla murder, kidnappings and extortion, and opportunity in the power vacuum 
to expand their influence and wealth.  The second reason: AUC success breeds 
AUC recruits.  The backlash of FARC atrocities fertilizes the AUC recruiting 
grounds (a principal that cuts both ways), but personal motives aside, people will 
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rationally join the winning side in order to share in the spoils.  Finally, like the 
FARC, the AUC attract youth from neglected portions of society without a hopeful 
future.  The AUC unabashedly seized upon the drug trade as its means of a 
stable and lucrative means of income.  It is well equipped and can attract willing 
fighters, if not for ideological reasons, then for an escape from a peasant’s life, 
excitement, revenge, a pseudo family, and money.  It too has expanded its direct 
involvement in coca cultivation.  Leaders make no excuse for executing, 
abducting, and intimidating their primary targets, which include guerrillas, and 
suspected guerrilla supporters and sympathizers.  The AUC maintained strong 
presence in northeastern Colombia – a traditional ELN stronghold – and is often 
credited for much of the ELN’s recent decline.39  The AUC has expanded 
incursions into Southern Colombia, directly challenging the FARC for control of 
coca cultivation in one of their traditional stronghold regions. 
This rapid growth rate is cause for serious security concern not only to 
human rights organizations but to the military as well.  Colombian General, 
Fernando Tapias, Armed Forces Commander, estimated that the AUC would be 
the number one threat for the government by 2005.40  Government forces have 
had difficulty shedding alleged AUC ties, reportedly condoning and collaborating 
in some of the world’s most egregious acts.  According to human rights groups, 
the AUC is responsible for the greatest number of extrajudicial killings and forced 
disappearances since 1995.41   Structurally, the AUC appears to favor a more 
decentralized model than the FARC.  The affiliation and loyalty of the one 
hundred-plus smaller organizations allows for more autonomy. 
3. Illicit Traffickers 
The apolitical third group, the traffickers, forms the nexus between both 
sides of the IAG spectrum.  In addition to narcotics trafficking, these profit-driven 
criminals take part in arms and human smuggling.  They do business with 
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whichever group can ensure maximum profit and protection of their products.  
For example, fellow leaders of the Norte Del Valle (NDV; successor to much of 
the Medellin cartel interests) cartel each have links to opposing IAGs.42  At the 
time of writing, the narcotics researchers, in adapting to eradication efforts, have 
developed a much larger, herbicide-resistant coca plants while simultaneously 
growing crops in much smaller size fields so as to avoid detection.43  Like the 
AUC, they do not espouse overthrowing the government, as is the goal of the 
FARC and ELN, but the negative social-economic effects are evident in 
increased corruption of officials, ties with Chinese and Russian mafias (as well as 
many others), lost legitimate business and its contribution to society.  The 
continued influx of money and arms further fuels to cycle of violence.  This group 
is relevant to this project to the extent that narcotics fuel the groups that threaten 
the state and IBRDF are tasked with counterdrug (CD) missions to defeat them.   
 
B. COLOMBIAN LEGACY FORCE 
A prominent feature of Colombia’s security forces throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s was the absence of direction.  Without a coherent national security 
strategy from which to draw upon, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) lacked 
guidance and initiative to articulate a lucid military strategy.  Absent these clearly 
defined requirements, congress failed to sufficiently fund the MOD.  This section 
describes how the lack of this strategic compass allowed leaders to drift into 
stagnant, reactionary missions, ineffective in the war effort.   
1. Structure & Employment 
Until the mid-1980s, the COLAR consisted of ten infantry and one training 
brigades.  By the end of the decade, they had added three brigades (two infantry 
and one logistics support).  Administratively, they restructured into four divisional 
headquarters (Santa Marta, Bucaramanga, Cali and Villavicencio), but stopped 
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short of making operational or tactical functional changes.  In 1992, the 
government announced plans for a multi-million dollar modernization program as 
well as an increase in the Army’s troop strength from approximately 120,000 to 
160,000.  During this critical decade however, the end-strength by 1999, 
remained at 121,000.44  The other services included a 15,000-person Navy 
(including 7-8,000 marines), 7,500-person Air Force, for a total just under 
145,000.45   
Of those in uniform, “less than a quarter, some 30,000 men were 
professional volunteers.  Of these, some 20,000 were being used in actual 
counterinsurgency operations.  The result was that the force in the field was not 
only grossly inadequate but was deployed in such a fashion as to ensure defeat.  
This was precisely what happened during the 1996-98 period.”46  As mentioned 
above, Colombian law exempts anyone with a high-school education from 
serving in combat units.  The large contingent of these bachilleres had an 
undermining affect on the Colombian military (COLMIL) and Colombian National 
Police (CNP), as the class system was counterproductive to forming force 
cohesion.  Requirements to guard over 5,000 critical infrastructural points 
(electrical, roads, communications, oil and gas pipelines and outposts), plus 
patrol 18,000 kilometers of roads and rivers, perhaps half of the Army –maybe 
less—were available to combat the IAGs.  As evidence of the lack of presence, 
“6,242 corregimientos [districts] needed military presence, but only 980 had it, 
while AUC, FARC, and ELN were present in some 5,300 districts.”47  
Conventional wisdom states that an effective counterinsurgency campaign 
requires a minimum of a 10:1 ratio, before accounting for extenuating variables  
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such as terrain, equipment disparity, and legal constraints.48  Counting only the 
FARC (15-18,000) and ELN (5-6,000) combatants, the actual ratio facing the 
military was closer to 1:1. 
In a time of CNP and COLMIL crisis, their rivalry and distrust fortified a 
parochial intelligence culture.  Stovepiped security agencies refused to share 
information.  Federal laws reinforced the line between the CNP’s counterdrug 
mission and the COLMIL’s counterinsurgency war.  Utilization of intelligence was 
ineffective even within the COLMIL itself.  Information was provided after the fact, 
or operators required verification of reports which came after opportunities had 
past.  In January 1999, General Charles Wilhelm, Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command, observed shortcomings as “mobility, intelligence collection 
capabilities, direct attack capabilities and certain aspects of command and 
control.  This is a mobility issue to a large extent, or how to effectively confront 
the traffickers and insurgents.”49  His assessment for improving the underlying 
mobility issue was to add attack helicopters, overhaul their riverine capabilities, 
while simultaneously improving command and control, intelligence analysis, 
production and dissemination. 
Colombia’s financial investment in its military has historically been among 
the lowest of any nation involved in internal security threats, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.2.  Its average annual defense spending in the 1990s was a mere 1.35 
percent of gross national product (GDP), and rose to only 1.89 percent in 2000.  
Colombian defense budget numbers include the National Police figures as well, 
which combined equated to US$3.256 billion or 3.5 percent of GDP in 2001.  
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Figure 3.2 Defense Spending of the 1990s -- Percentage of GDP 






Figure 3.3 Colombia’s Defense Spending, 1999-2003 
(Includes CNP; actual dollars)  
(From Reference: Jane’s Online, “South American Defence Markets, pp. 2-3) 
 
 
2. Strategic Reliance 
The modern Colombian-U.S. military relationship began with their 
participation in the Korean War, and their subsequent Cold War containment-
oriented assistance pacts.  Small-but-regular levels of military and economic aid 
have continued throughout the decades.  Prior to the late 1980s, most of the 
Army’s tired, obsolete lend-lease equipment was obtained from outmoded U.S. 
stockpiles.  Greater assistance may have been forthcoming if not for the United 
State’s experiences in Indochina and Central America in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.  
The fear of another Vietnam or El Salvador resulted in Congress’ erecting an 
arbitrary firewall between Colombia’s counterdrug war and their 
counterinsurgency war.  Strict laws prohibited any participation in the latter.  The 
counterdrug relationship deepened in 1989, when the U.S. military was assigned 
a significant role in the “Drug War,” expanding relational and funding 
opportunities.  The United State’s increased focus on counterdrugs efforts 
coincided with Colombia’s increased national insecurity.  Figure 3.4 depicts the 
sudden rise in levels of US aid throughout the 1990s, just as the Colombian Army 
Countries with Few Internal 
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entered into its low point, suffering tactical and operational defeats at the hands 
of the FARC.  Adding to Washington’s frustration was the nullification of regional 
successes in Bolivia and Peru’s coca production by increases in Colombia’s coca 
production.  Finally, amid the growing number of human rights abuse accusations 
involving government forces the initial presidential decertification decision was 
made in March 1996.   
 
Fiscal Year (FY) 
Agency     1996        1997       1998       1999       2000*       2001       2002    2003#(est)  Total 
State $ 22.6 $ 44.4 $ 83.1 $237.7 $774.9 $ 48.0 $275.4 $452.0 $1,550.3
DoD    14.5    53.2     61.4    80.9   128.5  190.2   119.1   149.9      587.7
USAID^ 0.0 0.0 3.3 6.3 123.5 0.0 104.5 151.0 379.0
Total 37.1 97.6 147.8 324.9 1,026.9 238.2 499.0 752.9 3,124.4
* Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY00, for   
   $330M (Division B of P.L.106-246). 
# Includes $93M in Foreign Military Financing funds appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L.108-7); $34M appropriated to State and $34M 
appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq 
for FY03 (P.L.108-11); and $37.1M for Foreign Military Financing allotted from FY03 supplemental appropriations. 
^ In FY00-03, State transferred $375M to USAID for alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally 
displaced persons programs. 
  
Figure 3.4 U.S. Aid to Colombia from 1996 to 2003 
(From Reference:  Henry L. Hinton, pp.5-6) 
 
According to a U.S. General Accounting Office testimony, this resulted in the 
cancellation or delay of approximately $35 million in U.S. counternarcotics 
assistance of a $75.5 million over the two year decertification.  “The Foreign 
Military Sales and State assistance was released in October 1996, but the 
foreign Military Financing grant aid and some military training were frozen until 
August 1997, when the President released it as part of a national security 
waiver.”50  The military took the largest hit as their units were accused of 
participating in or allowing the human rights abuses.  Of the $35 million, the 
COLMIL lost almost $30 million in Foreign Military Financing grant money, used 
to purchase helicopter spare parts, ammunition, explosives, and the like.  The 
loss of another $1.4 million earmarked for education and training affected both                                             
50 Henry L. Hinton, “Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing 
Challenges,” United States General Accounting Office (Testimony Before the Committee on 
International Relations House of Representatives, February 26, 1998, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-103), 
pp.5-6. 
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the police and military.  Approximately $3.6 million was lost in U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales Program of equipment to both the military and police.   
The U.S. administration re-certified Colombia’s military in the 1998 
certification process, and reinstated normal funding sources.  In light of the 
growing crisis in 1999, the U.S. Congress voted a $165 million supplemental aid 
package that was added to the previously authorized $124 million.51  However, 
Congress attached significant strings to its appropriation funding.  The money 
was to be used for CD missions only.  COLMIL forces were to create a pilot 
counterdrug battalion, comprised only of human rights-vetted soldiers, which 
equated to Colombia dedicating their best performers—the ones certain to pass 
the vetting process—to fight in the CD portion of a much larger 
counterinsurgency war.  Fiscal law and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 73 
prohibited the use of any intelligence and military assets against the left or 
rightwing groups.  So narrow, in fact, that if intelligence collected by U.S. assets 
detected a major FARC movement against the COLMIL, the information could 
not be shared.  Given the requirements levied upon the COLMIL and the limited 
support provided in return, it is understandable why the COLMIL become 
disillusioned by our level of support.  Nonetheless, General Tapias returned to 
General Wilhelm and accepted the terms to create the first CD Battalion.  Despite 
the shortcomings, the psychological and moral boost was as valuable U.S. a 
contribution as the funding. 
 
C. MILITARY CHANGE UNDER PASTRANA (1998-2002) 
Prior to 1998, the military adaptations to the changing threat had fallen far 
behind those made by their adversaries.  President Pastrana’s fundamental 
election platform was to bring about a peaceful settlement with the guerrilla 
groups and he is often overlooked for the prerequisite role he played in his 
tireless pursuit of peace.  While pursuing a peace agreement, he: a) appointed 
progressive generals to top positions; and b) successfully developed and 
marketed Plan Colombia to U.S. policy makers, thereby capitalizing on an 
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opportunity for international support for military assistance and aid for socio-
economic reform.  This section describes how the critical organizational changes 
of 1998 to 2002, were adaptive rather than transformational.   
1. Executive -- Plan Colombia 
Plan Colombia was an essential prerequisite for subsequent military 
transformation, but it should not be construed as causing transformation, nor was 
it intended for that purpose.  From the Colombian perspective, it was designed as 
a comprehensive 5-year strategy that emphasized the nation’s economic 
revitalization and social restoration.  From an U.S. perspective, it was a means to 
assist Colombians prosecute the counterdrug (CD) at its source, before arriving 
in the United States.  It was principally the brainchild of one of Dr. Jaime Ruiz, 
senior advisor to President Pastrana.  Funding for this comprehensive program 
called for burden sharing between producing and consuming nations.  Colombia 
was to invest US$4 billion, while the United States and the European nations 
would fund the US$3.5 billion balance (US1.3 billion and US$2.2 billion, 
respectfully).52  Pastrana’s plan called for Colombia to accept the lion’s share of 
fiscal responsibility of US$4 billion.  However, the proposed figures and those 
actually paid are quite different.  Due to economic recession and a budget deficit, 
Colombia has been unable to allocate even close to the amount envisioned.  
Unlike previous efforts that narrowly focused on military issues, Plan Colombia 
tackles issues previously addressed independently or ignored altogether.  Of 
U.S. aid, human rights and judicial reform garnered US$122 million, and another 
US$174 million went to alternative economic development measures in 
Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador.  The police received US$115.6 million and 
counternarcotics operations (including humanitarian assistance, helicopters, and 
development assistance), brought in US$390.5 million.53, 54  Of Colombia’s entire 
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US$7.5 billion program, the military portion equated to only 7 percent.55  The 
broad-brush elements of the Plan called for the following measures to be taken:  
1) promote rural alternative agricultural and economic programs, plus other rural 
development projects; 2) improve health care, education and social services for 
Colombians  
2. Armed Forces Corrections 
In August 1998, Colombia’s armed forces fully realized their predicament 
and the need to regain the initiative.  General Fernando “Tapias” Stahelin 
assumed the Commanding General position on the heels of U.S. decertification 
and conditional support.  Recognizing the moral value of domestic and 
international opinion, he turned his efforts to eliminating human rights violations 
and severing any AUC ties with the COLMIL.  Respect for human rights was 
emphasized in training and operations, and a zero tolerance policy for violations 
was invoked.  The COLAR is disproportionately responsible for conducting the 
counterinsurgency war, and the focus of alleged human rights violations.  
Commanding the Army was another progressive general, Jorge Enrique “Mora” 
Rangel.  Backed by President Pastrana, these commanders were able to initiate 
the first steps towards recovery and change.  Both Tapias and Mora had 
commanded the elite mobile brigades (BRIM), and both were essential to the 
pending reorganization. 
Beginning in 1998, military leaders had begun a painful 
restructuring.  They nearly doubled the number of helicopters, 
created a 4,000-strong rapid reaction force, and retrofitted five old 
turboprop planes with heavy machine guns and infrared radar for 
night operations.  They also gave soldiers a pay hike, hoping to 
reduce their dependence on young draftees and giving experienced 
soldiers a reason to stay longer.56   
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Generals Tapias and Mora initiated a program to replace conscripts with 
professional soldiers, reorganize the Army, and restructure the intelligence 
service.  Plan 10,000 took aim at replacing all conscripts with professional forces 
at a rate of 10,000 per year, for each the CNP and COLMIL.  The Army 
reorganized away from the U.S. doctrinal model (1=Personnel; 2=Intelligence; 
3=Operations; 4=Logistics) to one more relevant to Colombia’s war.  To reflect a 
need for greater planning and integration, the Operations directorate was led by 
a major general, Intelligence by a brigadier general, and Psychological 
Operations by a colonel.57  Further, centralized control was deemed more 
efficient and appropriate for countering the FARC’s new mobilized form of 
warfare.  Rather than parcel critical assets to lower levels, the management and 
authorization of helicopters and Special Forces was retained by the Commanding 
General. Organization was not the only change however.  Shortly after taking 
command, General Mora required a pledge from each senior officer that their 
forces would be combat-ready within 3 months of his assumption of command.  
Those who failed to deliver were replaced.   
Marked improvement was noticeable by mid-1999.  On December 9, 
1999, the elite Mobile Brigades (BRIM) and the Special Forces Brigade became 
the core of newly created rapid-reaction force, the Fuerza de Despliegue Rapido 
(FUDRA) battalion.  Pastrana’s plan increased the number of U.S. helicopters 
from 18 helicopters in 1998, to 172 by the end of his term in 2002.58  The 
enhanced force provided speed and flexibility, but were restricted to direct 
counterdrug missions alone; not available to combat Colombia’s 
counterinsurgency war.  Army forces extended their ability of supporting anti-
narcotics battalions and special Riverine brigades through the delivery of 
reinforcements, out-maneuvering the enemy, and employing air-to-ground fire.  
“Gone are the problems of moving support troops…The mission will be to hit 
strategic targets with all the force that these types of action demand,” said 
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President Pastrana.59  However, the COLAR’s inability to secure forward basing 
locations and aircraft range limitations prevented the new assets’ ability to affect 
the whole of Colombian territory. 
The traditional obstacles to rapid mobility are two North-South mountain 
ranges that split the country effectively into three parts.  The first new high 
mountain brigade was created to challenge the FARC along these strategic 
corridors utilized to smuggle arms, drugs, kidnap victims, and avoid COLAR 
pursuit.  Once denied these mobility corridors, pressure could be applied on their 
safe havens and training bases. These forces combined infantry, armor, 
engineers and artillery, capable of waging effective combat for five days without 
re-supply; common do to poor mountain weather conditions.  The increased 
capability of the Blackhawk over the UH-1N and Huey II helicopters enabled 
forces to search and destroy in the high Andes Mountains.  In 2001, the first 
battalion (Sumapaz Battalion) became operational, based near Bogotá in the 
Sumapaz mountain range. 60   
Intelligence groups underwent their own changes.  The Army’s central 
intelligence gathering unit, the 20th Intelligence Brigade, was completely 
disbanded due to human rights violations just prior to his taking office.  To avoid 
future abuses, Pastrana directed the formation of a new body, the Military 
Intelligence Center (CIME).  Stripped of any operational mission, they were 
instead assigned a support role: receive, process, and provide intelligence to the 
users.  Modernization efforts included technological intelligence gathering 
improvements.  The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), located in Tres Esquinas, 
was specifically created for, and legally restricted to, the counterdrug effort.  Its 
members fuse (process, analyze and disseminate) signals intelligence, such as 
communications intercepts along with imagery from U.S. reconnaissance planes 
and satellites.  The focal position of Director of Army Intelligence was created to 
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consolidate Army intelligence, but also report to the National Council for 
Intelligence, headed by Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of 
Military Forces.  Changes such as these continued throughout the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD), working to improve effectiveness and restore confidence.  
Between his inauguration and March 2001, Pastrana purged over 12,000 police 
officers due to allegations of corruption.61     
Unfortunately, Pastrana’s obsession with the elusive peace process 
denied Colombian of a unifying national strategy.  Lacking executive-level 
leadership,  or significant increase in resources, senior military officers repeated 
the cycle of employing incremental adaptations in response to the FARC.  
Planned development of new rapid deployment forces and regaining lost territory 
was conservatively planned without a sense of urgency proportional to the crisis.  
Government representatives courted FARC demands for resuming talks, granted 
despeje extensions, and fruitlessly endured month-long delays at the peace 
table.  Meanwhile, the FARC continued attacks, executions and Congressional 
kidnappings unabated.  The defense’s frustration came to a boil in May 1999, 
when Defence Minister Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo resigned over what he felt was 
desperate attempts to secure a settlement at the cost of Colombia’s security.  
Fifty other high-ranking officers followed in submitting their resignations, including 
eighteen generals, but Pastrana rejected all other resignations.  Only the 
Defence Minister was replaced with Luis Fernando Ramirez Acuna.   
The failed peace process will likely be his most memorable legacy of all.  
However, in the minds of Colombians and the international community, President 
Pastrana revealed the FARC’s true insincerity by his carrying the olive branch far 
beyond the point of any doubt.  The result served to rally support for President 
Uribe and both isolated and de-legitimized the FARC.   
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D. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION UNDER URIBE (2002-PRESENT) 
Legitimized by the full support of most Colombians and international 
community, President Uribe entered office promising to establish “democratic 
authority.”  Immediately, he declared a “state of commotion,” permitting his 
assumption of emergency powers.   In effect, he was also declaring war on the 
COLMIL’s business-as-usual demeanor.  This section describes how Uribe 
continues to lead his security forces from the period of adaptation to true and 
convincing transformation. 
By August 2002, the COLMIL had identified many IBRDF concepts, and 
were gradually bringing them on line (refer to section “Armed Force Adjustments” 
above).  President Uribe supported such initiatives as Fuerza de Despliegue 
Rapido (FUDRA), High Mountain Battalions, intelligence fusion, and Plan 10,000, 
but rejected the associated timetables.  However, in addition to accelerating their 
operational readiness dates, he increased the eventual total numbers to be 
produced.   
In May 2003, the second FUDRA battalion came on line (General Santos 
Gutierrez Prieto Battalion) to engage guerrillas in the corridor connecting the 
center of the nation with the eastern portion from its location in El Espino, 
Boyacá.  Also in May 2003, the Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo Battalion was placed 
near Cali, in the Los Farallones Mountains.  By mid-February 2004, three of six 
battalions were operational and effectively closing down FARC and ELN logistics 
lines.62  Fourth, fifth and sixth battalions will be located in Santiago (Cauca 
Department), Génova (Quindío), and near the Caribbean Coast (Magdalena), 
respectively.63   
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Forces (# of troops)          Jul 00           Jul 02         ’00-‘02       Jun 04        ’02-‘04         4-Year  
                                                                                   Incr.                             Incr.             Incr.     
Army 121,000 154,339 27.6% 187,788 21.7% 55.2% 
Navy 18,000 19,548 8.6% 23,200 18.7% 28.9% 
Air Force 7,300 7,527 3.1% 8,311 10.4% 13.9% 
Military Forces 146,300 181,414 24.0% 219,299 20.9% 49.9% 
Police 105,000* 97,382 -7.3% 114,421 17.5% 9.0% 
Total Uniformed  251,300 278,796 10.9% 333,720 19.7% 32.8%
Civilian Personnel (unavailable) 19,029 --- 18,416 -3.2% ---
Total Personnel ---- 297,825 --- 352,136 18.2% ---
Figure 3.5 Force Increases; 2002-2004 
(From Reference: Dra. Maria del Pilar Hurtado A., p. 1.) 
 
 
Elite Units  (totals)                             2002       2003       2004   
(projected) 
Subtotal   
(2004) 
   2005         2006        Total 
(projected)              (projected) 
High Mountain Battalions  1 3 2 6 1 1 8
Mobile Brigades (BRIM) 7 2 3 12 3 3 18
Urban Antiterrorist Special  
Forces Units (AFEAUR) 1 12 1 14 --- --- 14
Carabineros --- 10,000 5,000 15,000 --- --- 15,000
Auxiliary Regular Police  1,800 8,200 4,000 14,000 --- --- 14,000
Figure 3.6 Elite Unit Increases; 2002-2004 
(From Reference: Dra. Maria del Pilar Hurtado A., p. 9.) 
 
To fund the significant defense budget increase, Uribe capitalized on three 
factors to fuel the significantly larger IBRDF structure costs.  First, his election 
victory was correctly perceived as a mandate from the people.  As an 
independent candidate he enjoyed no official party support, but won by an 
unprecedented margin, and Congress would not dare oppose him in light of 
national approval.  He initiated a one-time war tax of 1.2 percent for citizens who 
possessed over US$65,000 in liquid assets.  The roughly 400,000 people who 
qualified contributed approximately US$ 1 billion.64  He has since led the effort to 
increase the Ministry of Defense budget from 2.4 percent of gross domestic 
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product (US$ 3.0 billion) in 2001, to 3.9 percent (US$ 3.02 billion) in 2003.65  By 
leading the tax restructuring effort, he intends to establish the eventual 5.5% by 
2006, which will remain in effect for as long as the conflict continues.  Second, 
with Congress’ awareness of events surrounding the FARC (failed peace 
process and municipal attacks), it is speculated, that recent COLMIL trends of 
success were deemed worthy of their support.  Ending the war was a national 
priority and the favorable operational results of units such as the FUDRA and 
High Mountain battalions combined to motivate greater congressional support.  
Finally, in light of the United States’ War on Terror, Uribe found a willing partner 
in Colombia’s effort to combat narcoterrorists.  Commitments for Colombian aid 
was raised another 50 percent from 2002 to 2003 (see Figure 3.4).  These three 
factor combined to fuel the transformation process.   
Critical to the intelligence portion of the IBRDF, U.S. expanded its support 
continued through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 18, titled, 
“Military Assistance to Colombia” (November 2002), and Expanded Authority, 
which came in 2003, thereby removing the firewall between the CD funds and 
counterterrorism (CT) funds.  “Operations today are more efficient and effective 
because our expanded authorities allow the same assets to be used to confront 
the common enemy found at the nexus between drugs and terror…Expanded 
Authority from Congress is essential to this [U.S. Southern] command’s ability to 
deal with narcoterrorists.”66  Greatly expanded intelligence is fused at the CIME, 
and pushed out to the operators, permitting rapid, decisive action.  In addition to 
providing raw intelligence, U.S. advisors are attempting to train the headquarters’ 
staff and battalion leadership to expand information sharing and shorten the 
response time once provided.67   
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President Uribe’s hard-line policy included a decapitation strategy; track, 
target and capture or kill guerrilla leaders.  Once these leaders are identified, 
direct action is taken against them.  In the first half of 2004 alone, 27 leaders 
were killed along with additional lieutenants and militias, in 850 combat 
encounters.68  In order to gain the necessary intelligence, he launched his idea of 
a 'million-man militia' on his first day as president.  This network of civilian 
informants were designed to augment the CNP and provide human intelligence  
(HUMINT) to security forces.  Next, a commando unit, created in 2003 and 
modeled after the U.S. Army Ranger battalion, was designed to utilize both low-
tech HUMINT and high-tech assets to conduct long-range tactical level 
reconnaissance and surveillance, specifically seeking out terrorist group 
leaders.69  Three Counter-Insurgency (COIN) formations, designated as 
Brigadas de Infantería Contraguerrilla, were also formed and assigned 
individually to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, together with seven additional 
battalions of military police.70 
Protecting infrastructure remains essential to Colombia’s economic well-
being, so the generals re-evaluated the true critical nodes, but rather than return 
to ineffective static outposts, two additional units were transformed into a quick 
reaction force designed to protect oil pipelines, electric pylons, and 
communications relays, in Northeast Colombia.  The 18th and 5th Brigades (BDE) 
each comprised of approximately four 500-person battalions, or 4,000 soldiers 
total.71  Until recently, petroleum companies and state officials either endured the 
lost revenue and massive environmental clean up from frequent attacks or paid 
extortion fees to terrorists to prevent such attacks; totaling US$450 in lost 
revenues in 2001.  Like other newly created units, the transformational aspect 
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involves taking existing forces, completely re-tooling their capabilities and order 
of battle to create of culture of success—it is the union of new mission concept 
and increased capability.  U.S. policy officials forecasted investing US$203 
million for 2003 and 2004 to train and equip elite troops, aviation (helicopter and 
C-130 aircraft) assets, and sustain the associated infrastructure security 
programs.72  At the time of this writing, the 18 BDE completed its one-year 
training, and the 5 BDE is being trained, with plans to also train National Police 
for this role.73   
Finally, the defense forces have initiated plans to counter the increasing 
cost associated with the IBRDF infrastructure.  Helicopter operations are among 
the most expensive budget items, but currently, each service is responsible for 
conducting their own maintenance.  To gain cost advantages, all depot 
maintenance will be consolidated under the Air Force, including the CNP assets.  
Additionally, the U.S. and Colombian governments are working together to 
accelerate train-the-trainer programs.  In so doing, Colombians can reduce their 
reliance on U.S. schoolhouse pipelines and contractor support, and more 
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IV. EVALUATION OF COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCE 
TRANSFORMATION 
Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing can be 
changed until it is faced. 75 
James Arthur Baldwin  
(1924-87) 
Our main objective is to help transform the Colombian military to a 
force that is capable of defeating the terrorist organizations, 
establishing presence and defense, in order to provide a safe and 
secure environment and governance throughout Colombia.76 
BG Galen B. Jackman, USA 
Director of Operations (J3), U.S. Southern Command 
December 18, 2002 
 
In a remarkably short period, Colombia’s security forces transformed from 
a defensive, urban-fortified force into a highly mobile, offensive force.  This 
chapter evaluates three aspects of their transformational process.  First, what 
measures of effectiveness support the claim of true Colombian transformation?  
Second, what shortcomings remain and how will they affect the desired process?  
Finally, what are the prospects of consolidating change in the long-term?   
The first segment reflects the positive impact of transformation on 
operations, security and force strength.  However, the second portion of the 
chapter discloses four major obstacles threatening to derail continued progress:  
parochial culture; IBRDF resistance; intelligence failings; and corruption.  The 
third section reveals that Colombia’s current progress toward institutionalizing 
change remains uncertain beyond President Uribe’s tenure. 
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A. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL 
FORCES 
As late as 1998, Colombia’s security forces endured battalion-size 
defeats.  In the time since, the nation has undergone two distinct improvement 
phases, coinciding to the with the administrations of Presidents Andrés Pastrana 
and Álvaro Uribe, respectively.  The years from 1998 to 2002, coined the 
preamble phase, benefited from visionary changes in organizational structure led 
principally by Army Generals Tapias (Armed Forces Commander General) and 
Mora (Commanding General of the Army).  While these years provided 
directional correction, it was 2002-to-present, that propelled the security forces 
into true transformation.   
Evidence of the combined success of both phases is found in numerous 
indicators, including: 1) operational results; 2) trends in civilian security; and 3) 
impact on the IAGs’ ability to operate.  Operational results provide convincing 
trend data of the defense force’s ascension beyond mere modernization.  
Similarly, the impact on civil society has greatly improved as a direct result of the 
sustained presence of the CNP, the COLMIL’s ability to apply increasing 
pressure on IAGs.  Finally, the IAGs are exhibiting signs of stress, indicated by a 
decrease in initiated operations, choosing civilian soft targets and increased 
demobilization.        
Preamble.  Under President Pastrana’s watch, Generals Tapias and Mora 
stopped the hemorrhaging, and mandated initial steps toward reconstruction.  
These changes should not be considered transformational, but rather the 
predictable military response of adapting to an increasing FARC threat.  Positive 
signs were evident within one year of Tapias and Mora’s implementation of 
structural change.  In July and again in November-December of 1999, 
government forces successfully thwarted two large-scale FARC offenses.  It is 
important to note that this period of time does not mark a clear indication of the 
war’s final outcome, but the latest shift in momentum that has repeatedly ebbed 
and flowed.   
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As part of Operation GATO NEGRO, the COLMIL launched an offensive 
near Barrancominas, in the Vichada department of eastern Colombia, in the 
heart of the FARC’s interests.  The area had served as a major staging base for 
attacks and was used to produce and process large amounts of coca.  It was 
also valuable in providing a mobility corridor for drug shipments to Venezuela 
and Brazil.  Approximately 3,000 FUDRA members descended on the area and 
captured 60 cocaine laboratories, 22 airstrips, 16 rebel camps, and 50,000 acres 
of newly discovered coca plantations.  Also rounded up was the FARC’s largest 
foreign trading partner and Brazil’s top drug dealer, Luis Fernando da Costa.  His 
network provided US$10 million in drugs-for-arm trade every month.77   
During Operation 7 de Agosto (2001), 1,300 FARC members were 
deterred from attacking locations in the South and East.  The operation also 
resulted in the capture of large quantities of arms, supplies and 17 FARC camps, 
and the body of a leading guerrilla commander, Urías Cuellar.  Over the same 
year, government forces launched major operations against AUC forces as well, 
killing 116, capturing 992, and seizing arms, equipment and financial records.78  
By December 2001, the combined efforts of the National Police’s Dirección 
Antinarcóticos (Anti-Narcotics Directorate, DIRAN) and military forces also 
destroyed “61 cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) labs, 330 cocaine base labs, 5 heroin 
and 9 other drug or precursor chemical processing facilities; had put 54 
clandestine airstrips out of service; and had sized or destroyed almost 30 metric 
tons of cocaine HCL, base cocaine and basuco (low-grade cocaine 
byproduct).”79   
U.S. aid was little more than psychological until November 2002 (NSPD 
18), in the counterterrorist war.  Until then, the conditional requirements actually 
drew  many  of  their  best forces away from fighting the FARC, and joined them  
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with U.S. assets which were limited on the counterdrug mission.  The war had 
effectively returned to the stalemate conditions that had dominated the past 40 
years.  
Transformational.  By exhausting all attempts at a peace settlement, 
President Pastrana laid the necessary foundation for his successor by uniting 
most of the nation against the FARC.  Upon Uribe’s inauguration, much of the 
preparatory steps were under way; the forces were growing larger, better led and 
equipped.  Similarly, training and organizational changes had improved, but they 
did not significantly challenge traditional norms, nor did they permeate 
throughout the force structure.  In other words, the response was measured 
rather than revolutionary.  Organizationally, the COLMIL was unwilling or unable 
to eliminate inefficiencies in the cultural status quo, which closely adhered to 
"cultural personalism."  This term refers to the practice of expanding one’s direct 
influence over others so as to accumulate indebted followers, thereby increasing 
one’s power.  One sees it displayed by the practice of disproportionately high-
level leaders taking direct part in approving awards, authorizing assignments, 
and the like.  In relative terms, the practice of delegating such authority equates 
to willfully weakening ones self and strengthening a subordinate officer.  The 
result is a huge disincentive to cooperate, even among your own military service.  
This phenomenon is not unique to the security community, as many of 
Colombia’s prominent leaders also adhere to this culture.   
Uribe’s unprecedented expectations of his military leaders ignited the 
second stage of change, and in so doing, initiated the COLMIL’s transformation 
process.  In exchange for demanding superior performance from his 
commanders and troops, he pledged his support and leadership in unifying 
Colombia’s strategic vision.   
1. Operational Results 
An obvious indicator of COLMIL success is their win-loss record.  The 
military’s last significant defeat occurred in October 2000, and even then it was 
the result of COLMIL errors rather than FARC successes.  Reinforcements were 
shot down as they attempted a daylight ingress.  The COLMIL has taken the 
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initiative and forced the FARC back to below-the-horizon warfare--denying them 
the ability to engage in mobilized warfare.80  One clear indicator of the offensive 
stance taken by the military is the dramatic increase in the number of tactical 
operations carried out against the IAGs.  The 4,523 missions in 2002, increased 
to 10,730 missions in 2003, or a 237 percent increase.  The COLMIL quantified 
their improvement as a 32 percent increase in overall effectiveness, measured by 
successful operations and captured assets in January-February 2004, as 
compared to the same period in 2003. 81   
Contrasting two 24-month periods (August ’00-July ’02 and August ’02-
July ’04) as illustrated in Figure 4.1, the counterterrorist operations netted a 205 
percent increase in guerrillas captured and 60 percent more casualties.   Of 
particular interest are the analogous AUC figures, which reflect steeper 
improvement curves at 258 percent and 206 percent respectively.  Yet raw AUC 
numbers represent half the guerrillas captured and only 20 percent of guerrilla 
casualties (see Figure 4.1).82  Among the killed and captured were 10 major 
terrorist leaders; a primary target of the government.  The COLAR disarmed 
and/or destroyed 890 explosive devices, 115 mined fields, 10 car bombs, 441 
gas cylinder bombs, and tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil, and ANFO and R-1 
explosives.  The COLAR also seized numerous rifles/shotguns, handguns, 
machine guns, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, mortars, hand grenades, 
and ammunition.83   
Assessing results against all IAGs in a single year, Figure 4.2 illustrates a 
slightly different perspective of Colombia’s current performance.  Of particular 
note are the 80 percent increase in total IAG captured and 73 percent increase in 
voluntarily demobilization.   Attacks on all infrastructural targets declined with the 
exception of oil pipeline attacks.  However, another source comparing two 18-
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month periods (November 00-July 02 and August 02-April 04) reflected a 37 
percent decline in oil pipeline attacks, dropping from 352 to 223.84  The positive 
trends extend to the neutralization of 2,259 terrorists (including 468 KIA), in 319 
clashes during January and February 2004.  Of the KIA, 246 were FARC 
members, 101 ELN, and 112 AUC, plus 9 others. 85 The Colombian Ministry of 
Defense annual running figures (January through August 2004), reported 1,321 
IAG members killed (735 FARC; 253 ELN; 23 other; and 310 AUC), 2,000 
captured (1,141; 236; 21; and 602 respectively), and 496 deserters (253; 60; 18; 
and 165 respectively).86 
 
Results of Terrorist Crimes Against the Public  
 Aug ’00-Jul ’02 Aug ’02-Jul ‘04 % Change 
        Paramilitaries (AUC) 
Captured 1,839 6,589 + 258.3% 
Casualties (WIA/KIA) 252 773 + 206.7% 
Demobilized/Deserters * - 1,257        --- 
Firearms Seized 1,540 5,803 + 276.8% 
       Guerrillas (FARC/ELN) 
Captured 4,247 12,977 + 205.6% 
Casualties (WIA/KIA) 2,390 3,841 + 60.7% 
Demobilized/Deserters  - 3,655        ---     
Firearms Seized 4,633 9,070 + 95.8% 
       Drug Traffickers 
Captured 59,261 97,670 + 64.8% 
Casualties (WIA/KIA) 1 9 + 800.0% 
Firearms Seized 885 1,510 + 70.6% 
 * Durante el actual periodo Presidencial se han desmovilizado en grupos 
1,042 miembros de las AUC, programa que lidera la Oficina del Alto 
Comisionado para la paz. 
Figure 4.1 Violent Crime Reduction Results -- ’02-’03. 
(From Reference: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional) 
 
The new mobile police units have also yielded impressive operational 
results.  The specially-trained carabineros forces enabled lasting police presence 
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through the utilization of helicopters as a force multiplier.  This combat-equipped, 
highly mobile light infantry police force was designed to infiltrate battle zones, win 
decisively and then turn the town back over to the municipal police force in 
decisive fashion.  Upon taking office in August 2002, Uribe’s directed the Minister 
of Defense, Martha Lucia Ramirez, to dramatically accelerate the planned return 
of CNP to 168 isolated municipalities, from 4-5 years to under 18 months.  
Despite objections, phase III was successfully completed in January 2004.87   
 
Counter Terrorism Results 
Terrorists 
(FARC, ELN & AUC): 
Feb ’02-Jan ’03 Feb ’03-Jan ‘04 % Change
Captured 5,460 9,839 + 80%
Casualties (WIA/KIA) 1,872 2,187 + 17%
Demobilized/Deserters 1,502 2,597 + 73%
Firearms Seized 4,677 7,046 + 51%
Grenades Seized 3,908 7,729 + 98%
Ammunition Seized 569,251 1,528,058 + 168%
Terrorist Attacks on: 
Electrical lines/Transformers 425 320 - 25%
Communication Towers 57 18 - 68%
Water Pipelines 10 3 - 70%
Towns  24 6 - 75%
Bridges 98 29 - 70%
Roads 261 99 - 62%
Oil Pipelines 59 180 + 205%
All Attacks 1,635 1,007 - 38%
Figure 4.2 Counterterrorism Results – ’02-’03.   
(From Reference: Ministry of National Defense, Vice Minister of Institutional Policy) 
 
 
2. Civilian Security Indicators   
One of the most striking measures of transformation is the direct impact 
on violence and crime rates, resulting from force restructuring and institutional 
changes.  It is essential that government forces triumph in the battle for 
municipalities in order to reestablish state legitimacy.  Colombia’s peasants have 
always represented the largest group of casualties, resulting from indiscriminant  
                                            
87 Dra. Maria del Pilar Hurtado A., p. 20. 
58 
targeting, followed by a crescendo of executions by the victors on suspected rival 
sympathizers.  Government forces must break this assault and cleansing cycle in 
order to protect its citizens.   
With police presence restored, the combined rapid mobility of military and 
police carabineros forces provide the necessary capability to deploy 
reinforcements and repel IAG assaults.  One such incident occurred on August 
23, 2004, when soldiers thwarted the FARC’s attempted capture of a bridge in 
Santa Rosa, a strategic town linking the Putumayo and Huila Departments.  
Although 13 soldiers were killed, the rapid response of air support and 
reinforcements denied the guerrillas of their objective.88   
Overall, the decreases in violent crime statistics associated with IAGs, 
such as those identified in Figure 4.3, are dramatic.  In a single year, massacres 
were cut nearly in half, 885 fewer people were kidnapped, and more than 5,700 
fewer people were murdered in homicides, a rate not seen in over 15 years.89  
Critics raise concerns over the violence levied by the state in regaining 
control, and subsequently question the validity of the statistics; reporting that 
government forces walk the town during the day, but paramilitaries rule some of 
these so-called liberated towns by night.  Further, extrajudicial killings bypass 
statistical tabulations since paras perform the assassinations in austere 
locations.90   While state figures undoubtedly fail to capture the entire truth-on-
the-ground, violence is in clear decline if for no other reason than constraints 
upon the FARC’s ability to wage revenge killings.  U.S. Southern Command 
figures reflect a 13 percent decrease in homicides, 53 percent decline in 
massacre victims, and 65 percent decline in road block kidnappings for the 
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period January to May 2004, as compared to the same period in 2003.91    U.S. 
State Department officials report that the murder rate in 2003 fell by 20 percent 
and kidnappings declined by 39 percent, while forced displacements fell nearly in 
half (49 percent), to the lowest numbers since 1999.  Their findings indicate the 
AUC-involved large-scale massacres and other killings appeared to decline 
during 2003.  While labor leaders and activists continued to be victims of high 
levels of violence, the number killed sharply declined.92  The fact that all numbers 
are consistently in decline indicates a general decrease in violence.   Had only 
homicides declined while other categories remained largely unchanged, then 
there would be reason to doubt the numbers.   
 
Violent Crime Reduction Results 
 Feb ‘02-Jan ’03 Feb ’03-Jan ‘04 % Change 
Homicides 28,386 22,675 - 20% 
Massacre Events 119 71 - 40% 
Massacre Victims 700 393 - 44% 
Kidnappings 2,972 2,087 - 30% 
Illegal Road Blocks 189 71 - 62% 
Road Block Kidnappings 706 271 - 62% 
Extortion Kidnappings 1,877 1,380 - 27% 
 Note:  The 2003 homicide rate (52 killings/100,000 people) is the lowest 
rate recorded since 1987. 
Figure 4.3 Violent Crime Reduction Results -- ’02-’03. 
(From Reference: Ministry of National Defense) 
 
The importance of municipal police presence and increased civilian 
security cannot be overstated.  It signals concern for its citizens, state legitimacy, 
security and stability.  From it flows optimism and opportunity.  As the Colombian 
Ambassador to the United States recently noted:  
Today, people and commerce are moving more freely and safely 
around the country… Improved security has resulted in economic 
growth. The economy expanded by 4 percent [in 2003], the highest 
annual rate since 1995.  Some 1.2 million jobs were created.                                              
91 Robert L. Hannan, Colombia Progress Info Sheet (U.S. Southern Command, Miami, July 
2004, available from: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidgovt.htm, accessed 20 September 
2004). 
92 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2003, Department of State [online] (Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2004, available from: 
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Following passage of a renewed Andean Trade Preferences Act in 
2003, Colombia-US trade grew by 10 percent.  GDP growth during 
the first quarter of this year was 4.1 percent.  However, Colombia's 
transformation is far from complete, as narco-terrorism and poverty 
still exist.93 
 
3. Impact on Force Strength and Enemy Operations   
Another method of gauging COLMIL success is to evaluate the impact on 
the behavior of the adversary, in particular on the IAGs’ ability to recruit and 
retain members and carry out operations.  This hypothesis argues that if the 
government forces are successfully transforming into a more lethal and 
professional force, then the FARC, ELN and AUC should be losing members at a 
rate greater than before transformation occurred.  Evidence should point to 
diminishing numbers, in both the casualties of war and desertions, and/or 
increased efforts to obtain volunteers or forced recruits.  Whether a Maoist 
organization or not, a group facing recruiting/retention problems will tend to 
curtail high-risk operations in favor of those with the greatest chances of success 
for three reasons: 1) preserve a shrinking resource; 2) bolster confidence within 
the organization; and 3) project to a strong image for consumption by potential 
recruits.  FARC strategy favors targets that combine strategic, operational and 
tactical value, such as a smuggling corridor co-located with a town.  When the 
prerequisite overwhelming advantage is not feasible, a target of lesser value is 
substituted or no attack made at all.  If the FARC assessment is correct, 
guerrillas will increasingly avoid direct COLMIL contact and instead settle for 
softer (unarmed) targets with achievable tactical gains achieved by overwhelming 
lightly defended towns, thereby affording troops to re-supplying and forcible 
recruitment of peasants.   
Overall Membership Levels.  Current unclassified information offers 
conflicting information on membership levels.  Indicators of the leftwing FARC 
and ELN point to declining numbers as a result of battle (casualties), capture and 
demobilization; refer to Figure 4.2.  Data supports the assertion that the 
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effectiveness of the IBRDF has raised the FARC’s cost of sustaining current ops 
tempo.  While their strategy remains unchanged, it dictates that tactics adjust to 
the increased government threat by returning below the horizon until they are 
afforded breathing room to regenerate.  This reasoning is compatible with the 
argument that the COLMIL forces are having a genuine impact on the FARC.  
However, the guerrillas do not possess the initiative and until the COLMIL allows 
them to steal it back they are incapable of staging a comeback.  In other words, it 
is currently the COLMIL’s game to win or lose, and constant or increasing 
pressure will prevent this regeneration from occurring.  If this opportunity is 
fumbled however, as in the past, the FARC will once again march toward Bogotá.  
The strategy of lying low serves two purposes.  First, the FARC become more 
difficult to target, avoiding unwanted pressure and inciting COLMIL frustration.  
Second, decreased operations at this time maintain group cohesiveness, by not 
making excessive demands on forces.   
The AUC, however, do not reflect a decline in numbers.  It remains to be 
seen if the latest estimate of 20,000 members accurately depicts a present trend 
or a result of a lag in reporting.94  Theoretically, several of the factors contributing 
to decreasing guerrilla numbers are also applicable to paramilitary members, but 
the failure of AUC numbers to decrease may indicate a policy failure to 
sufficiently target paramilitaries and/or an ineffectiveness of IBRDF forces 
against AUC groups.  The paramilitary numbers historically rise and fall inversely 
proportional to the effectiveness of government troops, without themselves being 
targeted.  As the COLMIL increases security, this trend should continue to lead to 
increased demobilizations. 
Increased Outflow.  Within the past two years, the risk of IAG membership 
has risen substantially, as have the incentives to reintegrate into society.  Since 
President Uribe took office, over 6,000 persons have demobilized, either 
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individually (5,000+) or as a group (AUC Cacique Nutibara Bloque of 1,042).95 In 
the first half of August 2004, 116 IAG members voluntarily turned themselves into 
state officials, for a total of 1,760 thus far in 2004.96  For the purpose of 
comparison, 3,580 persons voluntarily demobilized in 2003, as compared to 
1,412 in 2002.97  Former FARC members comprise the largest group, followed 
by the AUC, and then the ELN.  It is worth noting that these desertions equally 
represent the rural departments.  In other words, the causal factors are not 
specific to any single department or region.  Gender and age-specific factors can 
also be eliminated as the demobilized reflect the estimated populations of each 
group; of the 116, who demobilized in August 2004, 24 were children and 19 
were women or girls. 98       
Changes in two factors likely explain the recent upsurge in defections.  
First, the stick has gotten much more lethal as a result of the COLMIL’s ability to 
initiate surprise strikes on IAG training camps and supply corridors, or rapidly 
reinforce government troops to repel IAG assaults.  The COLAR reported killing 
1,166 terrorist members in the first semester of 2004, and the capture of 4,831 in 
more than 851 engagements.99  The groups once benefiting from the trend 
‘success breeds success,’ must now contend with its antithesis--regular defeat 
leads to demoralization and eventual defection.   
Second, President Uribe’s “National Government Reincorporation to Civil 
Life Program,” or Law 128, offers a carrot to deserters by appropriating funds for 
those who voluntarily abandon their IAGs.  The effort to rehabilitate former IAG 
members back into society is not new, but the level of resources devoted to it is.   
Program benefits include protection and health care for members and their                                             
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families, as well as economic assistance for the creation of small business, and 
technical or higher educational opportunities.100  In the past two years, 
approximately 80 percent of individuals have turned themselves in to the military 
or national police, reflecting the successful impact of force professionalization.101  
In the past, members rarely defected for fear of death from their own 
organization, or fear of retribution and torture at the hands of government troops.  
Those who did so anyway typically sought sanctuary from non-military 
governmental agencies or the Catholic Church.   
In sum, demobilization trends indicate an increasing number of members 
are willing to take the safety risk because continued membership is becoming 
more dangerous than demobilization and reintegration.  Critics assert that the 
incentive program is intended as a benefit for AUC members to avoid human 
rights violation prosecution (or extradition), while the stick is intended to crush the 
guerrillas.  However, evidence supporting this view is less than convincing, as 
deserters from left-wing groups appear to be taking full advantage of the benefits. 
Recruiting Challenges.  Colombian officials assert that the recent 
establishment of a police presence in every municipality has denied the FARC, 
ELN and AUC of an indentured recruiting pool.  While information acquired 
through debriefing former IAG members is classified, evidence of increased 
desperation is becoming apparent from other venues, especially among the 
FARC.  An organization that perceives itself as in control and confident typically 
broadcasts messages of gratitude, successes, and vision for the future.  
Conversely, an organization under increased external pressure tends to transmit 
messages of urgency; join the cause now.  A U.S. Southern Command Policy 
and Strategy representative pointed to the rhetoric and tone of the FARC’s 
French and Venezuelan websites, which typify the latter.  Colombian officials 
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report that guerrillas are augmenting their membership drive by the forced 
recruitment of an average of six to seven members per day.102  
Change in Enemy Operations.  Insurgent operational trends also suggest 
that the groups are operating under increased pressure, presumably as a result 
of the Colombian military’s recent IBRDF effectiveness.  Indications include: 1) 
their move away from mobility warfare back to guerrilla tactics; 2) a decrease in 
offensively initiated actions; and 3) the increased targeting of soft civilian targets 
rather than defended police and military targets.  These modifications indicate an 
unwillingness to risk precious assets, especially people, against legitimate 
military or government targets with a higher probability of failure.  While these 
indiscriminate methods of civilian terror show signs of desperation among some 
of the fronts, it should not be viewed as a last gasp.  The FARC remain capable 
of levying violence against unsuspecting targets, such as the May 2002 mortar 
attack that landed on a church in northwest Colombia, killing 119 people.  On 
Easter 2003, the FARC paid a boy to deliver a package, and then detonated the 
bomb when his bicycle was next to a religious procession, killing the boy, 11 
priests and injuring many others.  They are also suspected of launching the 2003 
El Nogal nightclub bombing in Bogotá that claimed 36 lives and wounded 160, 
and the grenade attacks on two Bogotá bars that wounded 72, including four 
Americans.103  What is the net assessment of current FARC capabilities? 
It is important to point out that these figures represent the FARC’s 
calculated response to the COLMIL’s increased mobility and lethality, rather than 
reflecting pending FARC defeat.  According to David Spencer, a noted expert in 
the field, the FARC are predictably adhering to their version of Maoist strategy, 
under centralized direction.  This strategy dictates that groups adapt to changing 
circumstances and use time to their advantage.  Analysts should not misconstrue 
recent adaptations as abandoning the long-term goal of overthrowing the 
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government.  Instead, the FARC should be expected to pragmatically evolve and 
employ realistic operations that promise success.104  They will prioritize and 
focus on their most critical strategic, operational and tactical points in order to 
succeed—those areas that combine key corridors, municipalities and populations 
centers.  If the risk of a large offensive operation is too high, they will forgo that 
target and redirect efforts elsewhere.  While the FARC have adopted a slower 
operations tempo, revenues continue to accumulate.  Several advantages exist 
in doing so.  Operationally and tactically, they avoid unnecessarily engaging a 
more lethal military force, and stirring a now-capable hornets’ nest.  Strategically, 
Uribe cannot remain in office indefinitely, an additional four years is uncertain.  
Decreased operations and public attention may deflect Uribe support to other 
socio-economic issues, hence other 2006 presidential candidates.  Further, U.S. 
elections in 2004 may have a diminishing effect on a partisan commitment for the 
War on Terrorism.  If the public’s interest is diverted from the counterterrorist 
effort toward socio-economic issues, congress will likely shift fiscal priorities, in 
kind.  Additionally, Uribe is under increasing international pressure to target the 
paramilitaries.  A decrease in perceived FARC threat may allow for a relative 
increase in counter-paramilitary pressure.   
AUC leaders, such as Miguel Arroyave, (leader of the largest paramilitary 
group under the AUC umbrella, Centauros Bloc), are aware of this pressure and 
in response are offering to demobilize in exchange for state guarantees no 
prosecution, legitimization of their narcotics-generated assets and protection 
from extradition to the United States.  Additional conditions include establishment 
of safe havens.105  These self-serving conditions indicate a position of strength.  
In other words, the top few leaders are not compelled to the peace table from a 
sense of urgency or crisis as a result of dramatic improvement in police and 
military IBRDF success.  AUC fissures are becoming increasingly evident.  In 
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April 2004, Carlos Castaño (AUC spokesman/leader) was ambushed and 
presumed killed by rival AUC leaders.  In early August of the same year, fifteen 
paras were killed when AUC members fought against the smaller Peasant Self-
Defense Forces of Casanare (ACC).106  For the average, low-level para member, 
this is genuine reason for concern as they pay the price of being pawns caught 
between a slow diplomatic peace process and an urgent need to target rightwing 
members.  While the peace process is expected to drag on, principally due to the 
United States’ insistence on extradition, it is speculated that front-line troops will 
increasingly risk defection in proportion with the decline of the FARC threat.107       
 
B. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
In light of genuine progress, mainstream analysts have upgraded 
Colombia’s future prognosis from doubtful to hopeful, but a healthy dose of 
caution is advised in light of four principal shortcomings in the COLMIL’s 
transformation process.  The first weakness is their resistance to cooperate 
across branches of service and with the CNP, forfeiting the benefits of joint 
operations.  Second, a lack of uniform IBRDF concept support is prevalent 
among mid-to-senior level officers despite the education and operational results.  
The third weakness exists in the friction of intelligence sharing and responding 
quickly to time-critical opportunities; again sacrificing probable victories.   Finally, 
internal corruption, especially among the CNP, destroys the reliability of 
intelligence and force cohesion paramount to IBRDF actions. 
1. Parochial versus Joint Culture 
First, within the Ministry of Defense the culture of joint-level cooperation is 
an enormous disappointment.  While synergistic examples exist, they are the 
exception rather than the rule.  Without President Uribe’s forceful direction, the 
small amount of progress at the national level would not have occurred.  Case-in-
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point—the national-level Operation ORION ’02 was a joint effort to rid Antioquia’s 
capital, Medellin, from guerrilla domination.  President Uribe gave the order for 
the 1,000-plus person task force (Army, CNP, Air Force and Special Forces as 
well as members of the intelligence services) to move into Medellín's Comuna 
13, a district of 100,000 people with tanks, infantry and helicopters.  The state 
reported the rescue of 30 kidnap victims, conviction of 28 people for their terrorist 
connections, and the successful liberation of the city by maintaining a 1,500-
person military presence until all known guerrilla presence was eradicated and 
police could maintain order.108,109   
However, while the government promotes the theme of joint cooperation, 
facts on the ground do not support it.  The most severe distrust and rivalry exists 
between Army and National Police forces.  Their mutual contempt has worsened 
through the decades and the turf battles intensify as a result of possessing 
overlapping capabilities.  Less adversarial is the Air Force and Navy relationship 
with the National Police, whose capabilities complement each other, and thus 
some cooperation has occurred.  Regional pockets of cooperation are also 
evident, but generally, the best cooperation so far occurs at the very bottom, 
where municipal level police and unit commanders only have each other to rely 
upon.  At the lowest levels of security, turf wars are less relevant, and municipal 
security takes center stage.  In light of the established rivalry, one favorable 
indicator is the increasing regularity with which interagency officials are providing 
the other agencies courtesy information of on-going or pending operations, as a 
means of avoiding fratricide.110  However, this kind of deconfliction of operations 
falls far short of the kind of cooperation needed for mobile, intelligence-based 
forces in both services to act effectively.  Progress on this front will require 
deeper commitments from actors on both side of the police-army divide.  
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2. Resistance to IBRDF Concepts 
The second red flag relates to a common resistance to IBRDF concepts 
within the military despite recent evidence of success.  According to Brigadier 
General P.K. Keen, former Military Group Commander, Colombia (2001-2003), 
the greatest resistance to change is originating from the mid-to-upper grade 
officer corps; specifically those officers who have not attended a U.S. military 
staff school.  Conversely, their peers who have attended U.S. war colleges, 
where the doctrinal concepts of intelligence based operations and rapid decisive 
operations were studied in detail, are among its biggest supporters.  Indicative of 
this resistance, the fledgling concept of delegating authority to non-
commissioned officers has caused a split along the same experiential lines.  The 
professional military education (PME) conducted in Colombian has failed to 
effectively ignite the vision.  A clear delineation exists between Colombian 
educated and Americanized officers, and while the trend is improving, they 
remain many years from embracing the Uribe, Mora and Ospina vision.  If, in the 
meantime, reluctant officers are appointed to key positions of leadership the 
initiatives will surely die.111 
Additionally, as a cross-section of Latin American society, the military 
exhibits a prevalent trait known as "cultural personalism."  This is the practice of 
constantly accumulating influence so as to expand one’s following of indebted 
persons.  Retaining direct oversight responsibilities is the means to obtain more 
power, whereas delegating authority weakens oneself.  Thus, it is common for 
disproportionate level officers signing orders, giving awards, and the like.  This 
produces a large incentive to hoard power rather than cooperate, even among 
your own military service.112  Joint operations, such as those advocated in an 
IBRDF force, requires commanders who are willing to forfeit influence in the 
interest of mission success. 
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3. Intelligence Sharing 
Third, government forces continue to squander the perishable asset of 
intelligence due to a failure to share information or operationalize it effectively.  
Intelligence that American forces would consider actionable (reliable and specific 
enough to warrant action), is often viewed as incomplete to Colombian operators.  
Whether due to distrust between analysts and operators, or other factors, forces 
must act with greater decisiveness.  The time-critical nature of intelligence 
requires that they drastically improve the current 12 hour-to-2 days turn time.  An 
intended benefit of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) was to model effective 
intelligence sharing so the example would replicate throughout the rest of the 
security structure.  Optimally, intelligence is most useful when it enables entry 
into, and disruption of, the adversary’s decision loop cycle, and manipulates 
responses in a predictable manner—thereby achieving information dominance.  
The information superiority now enjoyed is enhanced due to increased internal 
coordination and expanded U.S. intelligence sharing.  A new level of success is 
expected once analysts and operators maximize the art of intelligence to 
anticipate and act on an adversary’s actions rather than waiting for reports to be 
verified before acting.  
4. Security Force Corruption 
The final major factor impeding the transformation process is police and 
military corruption.  A principal challenge for senior officials is to prevent their 
officers from becoming compromised through corruption or association with 
IAGs.  Quite simply, corruption is the exchange of loyalty from legitimate to 
illegitimate.  Regardless of degree, “No one can serve two masters; for either he 
will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and 
depose the other.113  Corrupt individuals devastate investments in intelligence 
gathering, equating to the assassinations of reliable informants and the 
enormous difficulty in replacing them.  A tip off destroys surprise, which not only 
results to a loss of mission success, but the enemy is poised to capitalize on the 
information and ambush government forces.   
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CNP corruption scandals continue to appear with regularity.  The head of 
the Highway police was dismissed in December 2003, while only a month earlier 
National Police Chief Teodoro Campo himself was fired surrounding corruption 
charges.  Among the largest setbacks to building mutual trust and confidence 
came in July 2003, when police sold back three tons of seized cocaine to the 
drugs traffickers along with DEA informant information, which resulted in the 
eventual murder of two of the three men.  Instances such as this perpetuate the 
culture of distrust and prohibit cooperative efforts that require a foundation of 
trust.  Military corruption appears far less frequently.  In fact, the COLMIL is 
regarded as one of the least corrupt sectors of society, but occasionally it occurs.  
In July 2004, the New York Times reported Colombia’s discharging of over 500 
military personnel for poor performance or suspicions of corruption or human 
rights abuses, of which 67 were officers with suspected links to right-wing 
groups.114  Uribe is effectively raising the price for those inclined to abandon their 
loyalty to the state, but as long as it is prevalent, it alone can nullify intelligence 
and turn the element of surprise into a disastrous operation.   
 
C. CONSOLIDATED CHANGE OUTLOOK 
The prospects of long-term consolidation of existing reforms, and the 
forecast for necessary additional reforms to occur, are linked to attributes within 
both the military and civilian ranks.  Progress within the military depends first on 
identifying progressive and competent leadership; and second on continued 
emphasis in professionalizing the force.  Meanwhile three key factors effecting 
lasting change in the civilian realm rest first with the president’s leadership, then 
legislative support (funding), and finally the continued support of the Colombian 
people.   President Uribe’s leadership style has propelled change, but must now 
broaden out the vision and responsibility in order for it to institutionalize among 
the policy leaders.  Congress has thus far failed to take a leadership role, instead 
opting to follow constituent desires.  Fortunately, Colombian support has 
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provided Uribe with a mandate for change.  As long as his support remains 
convincing, congress and the people will support transformational policies. 
1. Likelihood of Continued Military Support for Transformation 
Within the Ministry of Defense’s own control, the element of leadership will 
determine the COLMIL’s cultivation of lasting change or prevent change from 
becoming institutionalized.  Fortunately, for Colombia, the fledgling IBRDF force 
had a solid cornerstone of leadership and capable BRIM and Special Forces, 
upon which to build its larger success.   
It is intuitively obvious that the armed forces own leadership is among the 
most critical elements in the success or failure of continued transformation.  
General Mora’s steady building-block approach, initiated by General Tapias and 
continued by General Ospina, has created a firm foundation for future 
generations.  This reverses the prevalent trend throughout the 1990s, when the 
Armed Forces Commander position lacked the continuity necessary to correct 
fundamental military problems.  Generals eased into the position in the twilight of 
their careers and retired in an average of just 15-months, while three of the eight 
generals retired in less than 9 months in office.115  Successors generally came 
into office without the benefit of program continuity.  Attempting effective change 
in such a short period is difficult enough, but “wholesale housecleaning of 
incompetents” was required of this top position.116  General Tapias brought 
legitimacy and purpose to the top office, with a vision of improving force conduct 
and performance.  His close working relationship with his two eventual 
successors, Mora and Ospina, infused much needed continuity.  Mora held the 
top military office for five years, using that time to pioneer new concepts of force 
employment and organization.117  General Ospina succeeded Mora in November 
2003, and is advancing Mora’s tradition of change.  All three men were former 
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BRIM commanders, and all shared extensive combat experience in the IV 
Division -- conflict epicenter and FARC stronghold.118   
Appointing competent progressive leaders remains critical to maintaining 
long-term strategic direction of the armed forces; however cultural changes are 
occurring very slowly.   A positive indication however, is the effect of Uribe’s 
“Trabajar, trabajar, trabajar” (working, working, working) motto and example on 
the armed forces community.  The entourage of senior military and police officers 
who accompany the president are becoming accustomed to traveling to front line 
conflict zones to receive the unfiltered realities and issues of the war.  “This 
[intensified] work ethic has cascaded down to every rank in the Police and 
Military,” observed Colonel Higgins (U.S. Army, retired).  He continued by saying, 
“I saw a near instantaneous transformation on Uribe’s inauguration day.” 119  
Senior officers are applying the principle of personal accountability and closer 
supervision among their ranks; impressing the importance of performance and 
signifying their personal interest.  The bachilleres (high-school graduate 
conscripts) are being phased out.  Recognizing that these combat-exempt 
soldiers are incompatible with the offensively minded IBRDF force, the military 
and police have reduced these forces by 19 and 25 percent, respectively, from 
July 2002 to January 2004.120 
Two additional components of Colombia’s leadership role are less 
convincing, but warrant mention.  First, U.S. senior officers have long 
encouraged the Colombians to develop a written strategy to articulate and guide 
the COLMIL’s actions, followed by molding officers to adhere to it.  General Mora 
published Colombia’s first-ever national military strategy titled, “Strategic  
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Direction 2003.”  This document represents a hopeful sign for eventual 
developments, but does not have much intrinsic power to sustain transformation 
in its infancy.  
The second under-developed component of military leadership is the 
COLMIL’s regional military to military cooperation efforts.  Plan Patriota is a 
Colombia’s first large scale, on-going military offensive in traditional guerrilla 
strongholds that began in late 2003.121  In addition to greater U.S. assistance, its 
long-term success depends on the guerrillas being squeezed between COLMIL 
and neighboring state security forces, rather than simply allowing them to slip 
away.  Hence, increased multi-lateral or bi-lateral cooperation is necessary, yet 
the effectiveness of such efforts remains uncertain. 
2. Likelihood of Future Civilian Support for Transformation 
Among the civilian sector three distinct groups could conceivably influence 
the continued progress.  Presidential powers, and Uribe’s personality in 
particular, currently reflect the singularly most influential and hopeful indications 
for continued change.  Second, the legislative branch retains appropriations 
authority, but is has failed to assume a larger leadership role.  Finally, the 
general public exhibit enormous support for Uribe and by extension the 
improvements in the armed forces, but at an unfamiliar price.  
Executive Branch Leadership.  The best defense against truncating 
transformation lies with Uribe, and extending his leadership beyond 2006.  Uribe 
enjoys universal esteem among policy makers, academics and professionals, as 
the single largest reason for success.  Similarly, he has benefited from the 
transformation process among his general population as his approval ratings 
remain between 70-80 percent, although the ruling elite resist some of his 
governmental reform initiatives.122,123  Every additional year under his direction 
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deepens the fledgling roots of change through his measure to increase the 
budget, demand rapid change, and reject old paradigm timetables. 
However, what is the strongest indicator for success is also this author’s 
most glaring critique.   Despite all the positive effects of President Uribe, he will 
fail the citizens of Colombia if he leaves office without doing a lot less—and 
requiring others to do a lot more.  In other words, key persons in every ministry 
and department must be mentored to carry on his vision of embracing change 
and despising the status quo; to challenge cultural norms and seek uncommon 
efficiencies.  The current political movement to amend their Colombian 
Constitution to permit reelection of the president remains uncertain.  
Alternatively, another person(s) should be groomed for leadership who shares 
Uribe’s character, vision and conviction.  Unfortunately, such a person does not 
exist and therefore, the issue of presidential leadership remains uncertain.  
Expect his leadership style to remain the engine behind the military’s 
transformational process.  In the long run, his failure to proselytize and mentor 
other policy makers leaves Colombia’s future leaders susceptible to the 
numerous officers bent on subverting transformation before it can emerge from 
infancy.     
In contrast to the President Uribe, the Ministers of Defense have not 
shared a strong leadership role.  Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez (August 2002 – 
November 2003) was selected for exceptional administrative abilities and appeal 
to U.S. policy makers rather than a consummate knowledge of military art.  
Uribe’s public rebuke of her actions while siding instead with the Air Force 
general in April 2003, effectively hobbled the possibility of continued leadership 
authority.  Her successor, Jorge Alberto Uribe Echavarría, also shares no military 
affairs experience, but is instead is a noted administrator.124  In both cases, the 
purposeful selection of bureaucrats rather than visionary leaders nullifies hopes 
that this position can serve to assert “actual” authority over the military. 
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His legacy includes these characteristics, but as goes Uribe, so goes 
Colombia’s war, and by extension, military progress.  Uribe has two years 
remaining in his term, but he is under constant danger of an IAG assassination.   
Legislative Branch Support.  Congressional leaders have failed to step up 
and address this issue.  The president’s enormous popularity remains the 
principal motivation for their current congressional support for defense programs.  
Hence, the outlook for long-term congressional commitment is poor.   
Even if the presidential and congressional commitment is sustained, what 
impact will political corruption have on security force transformation?  Corrupt 
officials may not only pressure for the appointment of soft or inept leaders within 
the military, but also obstruct operations or leak information used by military and 
police to gain intelligence and surprise advantages.  It is necessary that clean 
officials capitalize on current advantages and drive the IAGs to complete 
capitulation or destruction—anything less only creates new problems for the next 
generation.  Pressure must continue to increase, rather than remain constant, or 
IAGs will adapt to the current IBRDF battle rhythm, undermining military success 
and reemerge as a stronger force.   
General Public Support.  The third category of concern is Colombia’s 
growing price tag associated with sustaining this expanded force in relation to 
their historically allocated funding.  This point addresses Congress’ willingness to 
appropriate funds as well as the COLMIL’s wise stewardship and investment in 
needed procurement.  Unlike textbook transformation of replacing a large legacy 
force with IBRDF structure, Colombia’s situation requires that government troops 
occupy the land as well as transform, meaning that new mobile forces must be 
added on top of the existing force structure.  The total Colombian Ministry of 
Defense budget, which includes the National Police, was US$3.02 billion dollars, 
or 3.9 percent GDP (2003).125  The COLMIL’s unfunded requirements in 2004 
totaled US$720 million, including such essential transformations items as 
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equipping citizens soldiers with arms and communication equipment, create new 
battalions and units to expand state presence, and fund the mobility assets so as 
to retain uninterrupted support; see figure 4.4.  In addition to these shortfalls, a 
June 2003, U.S. General Accounting Office report estimated the cost of 
sustaining just the current aviation maintenance programs related to the 
counterdrug mission (helicopters and aerial eradication planes) were an 
estimated US$230 million.  The report concluded that Colombians are unable to 
assume additional CD funding responsibilities on top of existing counterterrorist 
commitments, thereby dashing any hopes of a decreasing United States role.  
U.S. assistance will continue for the foreseeable future; projected to be 
US$731.00 and US$720.92, in 2004 and 2005 respectively.126,127   
Public opinion must support more than simply maintaining the current 
force however.  As mentioned above, even Uribe’s forecasted force size is 
insufficient to employ a persisting strategy.  Significantly more mobile airlift is 
required, especially in light of maintenance reliability rates.  To illustrate, the 
COLAR possesses thirteen Russian made Mi-17 helicopters, of which only three 
are operational on the day of this writing.  Several of the others are hard-broke, 
meaning they must be shipped back to Russia for maintenance.  The Army’s UH-
60’s maintain an average readiness rate of less than 50 percent.128  Despite 
Expanded Authority, a complex approval process of Plan Colombia assets for 
counterterrorism rather than CD missions limits their use by the COLMIL.  In fact, 
ongoing CD efforts are effectively pulling the few unrestricted assets away from 
the counterterrorist fight.129  Some estimates suggest as much as 400 
helicopters total are needed, whereas current numbers remain well below 200, 
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including the CNP, COLMIL, and counterdrug-only assets.130  Additional fixed 
wing aircraft are also needed to deliver reinforcements to the conflict zone and 
sustain them during combat.  The number of enormously expense assets is a 
formidable obstacle for a nation that dedicated only 2 percent of their GDP 
toward the war only a few years ago, requiring a fundamental shift in values.  If 
not for Uribe’s commitment to funding the war effort, the recent military success 
will tend to lull policy makers into a false sense of security followed by the 
diversion of scarce resources to neglected social and economic issues in light of 
the long recession the country has endured.   
Interestingly, Colombia and the United States have traveled this road 
together before.  At the bequest of Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo, 
the United States team led by CIA officer Hans Tofte submitted a preliminary 
report in January 1960, naming the security forces inability to take effective 
action was due to a lack of information; remaining in garrison; ineffective 
intelligence organizations; and a publicly despised CNP.  A subsequent report 
two years later led by Yarborough, cited a lack of collaboration among the DAS, 
CNP and military, and inadequate transportation and communication equipment.  
Presumably out of frustration resulting from a lack of capabilities, the COLMIL 
ruthlessly went about putting down insurgencies and bandit gangs alike over the 
next critical years.  The government’s retrenchment and propensity for excessive 
violence spawned the resurrection of insurgent tensions.131  The COLMIL 
effectively debilitated the FARC in 1968, but being unable to bring about final 
resolution, the group revitalized throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.132 
To implement a cultural change that will embrace the concept of 
transformation beyond the next decade, President Uribe and pro-transformation 
MOD  principals  must  make  the  most  of  brief window of opportunity.  Success  
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Unfunded Necessities -- 2004 
Item Category                                                                                   Amount (million)
Equip Citizen Soldiers (communications, weapons & transportation) US$ 169
Plan Energetico Vial Battalions (5) 122
Air Force Armament, Maintenance and Flying Hour Program 122
Carabineros (5,000 – National Police Rapid Response Infantry) 80
Eastern Command’s Mobile Battalion 66
Military Liaison Soldiers (2,000) to Work with Citizen Soldiers 40
Ready-Auxiliary Police Force (2,500) 27
Riverine Combat Elements (4) 22
Riverine Swift Boats 16
Renovation of Communication Equipment 14
Three Naval Counterguerrilla Companies (2-Carib; 1-Pacific) 13





relies upon the correct personalities being placed into key positions, education 
expanded to all of tomorrow’s executives, and continued domination in the 
battlefield. 
 
Figure 4.4 Colombian Unfunded Requests – 2004 
(From Reference: Dra. Maria del Pilar Hurtado A.) 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To build may have to be the slow and laborious task of years. To 
destroy can be the thoughtless act of a single day.133 
 
Sir Winston Leonard Spenser Churchill  
(1874-1965) 
Look, we have the snake almost defeated.  If we let go now and 
allow it time to breathe, the snake not only will survive but will grow 
again.134 
President Alvaro Uribe 
October 14, 2003 
 
 
Faced with a growing national threat, a handful of Colombian leaders 
initiated efforts to reform the armed forces by leveraging superior intelligence to 
deploy forces rapidly. This concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the 
thesis in an effort to discern possible lessons for other developing nations with 
legacy forces that are incapable of addressing emerging threats.  The first half of 
this chapter is comprised of three sections that initially summarize growing 
security threat concerns, then synopsize the key events and actors in Colombia’s 
process of transformation, and finally asses Colombia’s progress.   
The second half of the chapter contains four segments.  First, what 
lessons can we draw from Colombia’s experience?  Second, what are the 
obstacles faced by Colombia, which are common conditions in other developing 
nations.  Third, what should the United State’s policy be in assisting other 
developing nations make a successful transition?   
 
A. RELEVANT THREAT 
When the bi-polar world order collapsed in 1989, developing nations 
unexpectedly entered a new era of self-reliance; no longer able to count on its 
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aligned superpower for strength.  Many governments remained underdeveloped 
and incapable of exercising control over territorial boundaries.  The largely 
stationary, legacy force structures that served them since WWII soon became 
ineffective against emerging threats of insurgencies, international and religious 
terrorism, WMD proliferations, and transnational crime.  The IBRDF model 
emerged (under various names) with characteristics needed to defeat small, 
agile, sub-state enemies.  Combining the concepts of information superiority and 
immediate direct action produced a new level of state lethality ideally suited for 
security threats such as that facing Colombia.  
 
B. COLOMBIA’S EXPERIENCE 
Colombia’s policy makers serve at a critical juncture.  A great opportunity 
is at hand to end a 40-plus year long chapter of internal violence and destruction.  
If leaders fail to advance through this juncture, they will have squandered the 
best opportunity available to them since the late 1960s to bring peace and 
stability to their citizens.  This section summarizes how the circumstances and 
key actors brought Colombia to their current situation.   
From the 1960s through much of the 1980s, the COLMIL and FARC 
organizations mirrored the other.  Both sides fought against the other to an 
essential stalemate.  Small innovations from time to time caused minor ebbs and 
flows, but neither managed to gain an advantage sufficient to defeat the other.  In 
the mid-1980s throughout the 1990s, the FARC capitalized on enormous 
revenues from the narcotics industry.  The cash flow allowed them to acquire 
modern weapons, state-of-the-art command and control communication 
equipment and the expansion of territorial influence.  They developed a written 
strategy and numerically grew, expanding regional coverage from 15 fronts to 
over 65, but they retained the same hierarchical organizational structure.135   
The war approached crisis levels during President Samper’s crippled 
administration (1994-1998), which was crippled by accusations of narcotics 
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corruption that led to an unsuccessful impeachment process.  Meanwhile, CNP 
intensified their counterdrug efforts and were successful in breaking up the large 
cartels.  Animosity and lack of cooperation between the CNP and COLMIL left 
the COLMIL ill prepared for the resulting decentralization of the drug trade, which 
led to increased insurgent involvement in the drug industry.  The increased 
resources facilitated a FARC transition from guerrilla tactics to maneuver 
warfare.  The result was military defeats in the field and CNP outpost 
annihilations, leading many observers to fear for the survival of the Colombian 
state.   
Whereas the FARC had vastly expanded resources to gain an advantage, 
the COLMIL was forced to find other means.  Almost immediately upon taking 
office in 1998, President Pastrana’s hand-picked generals, Tapias and Mora, 
selected IBRDF concepts to counter the insurgent threat -- reorganizing and 
creating new highly mobile, rapidly deployment forces, acting on near-real time 
intelligence.  Modest aid came from the United States in 1997 to 1999, and a 
flood of assistance with Plan Colombia, in 2000 to 2001, but it was legally 
obligated to the counterdrug mission and offered little to the counterinsurgency 
war.  Despite resource limitations, the COLMIL battled back to parity within a 
year, completing Colombia’s cycle of violence.   
Several circumstances and initiatives combined by 2002, to create 
transformational change.  The failed peace process had mobilized public opinion 
against the FARC, and in favor of presidential candidate Uribe’s promise to take 
a hard-line stance against armed actors.  Uribe rejected the military’s existing 
paradigms for change and demanded increased performance.  The ascension of 
General Mora and appointment of General Ospina complemented Uribe’s 
progressive vision.  New rapid deployment force operational dates were 
accelerated, while adding additional units for training.  Despite congress’ passive 
approval and lack of leadership, Uribe marshaled the necessary increased 
funding requirements through the introduction of tax reform legislation.   
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Not surprisingly, much of the strongest resistance to the IBRDF concept 
exists within the CNP and military forces themselves.  The dominant parochial 
culture and inter-service distrust has inhibited greater progress on joint 
operations.  Evidence of joint ops is lacking at all levels except the Joint General 
Staff, where it is heavily emphasized, and at the austere municipal levels, where 
CNP and military must rely upon each other.  The future of Colombia’s 
transformation depends on the tendencies of those selected for key positions in 
the near future.  
 
C. ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE 
It is extremely rare to witness an event such as that presently occurring in 
Colombia.  Nations are generally staunchly opposed to challenging their own 
military culture except in time of recognized defeat or extreme crisis.  The 
gradual intensification of the FARC threat did not shock most Colombians into 
perceiving the war as either a defeat or severe.  Yet, transformation has occurred 
to the past two years thanks to the vision and support of only a handful of 
leaders. 
The operational results and civilian security reports presented in chapter 
IV reflect dramatic improvements that cannot be explained by simply adapting to 
the FARC threat, or throwing money and resources at the problem.  As described 
above, the counterdrug assets have not yet been effectively employed against 
Colombia’s terrorist threat.   
Despite the good news, four key shortcoming remain in their journey 
toward an IBRDF structure.  By no coincidence, all four factors relate to the 
psychological resistance to change, and not a lack of ability.  Presumably, this 
opposition comes in response to a lack of consensus that transformational 
change was required.  One may conceivably reason, had the crisis escalated to a 
greater extent, resistance to change would now be proportionally less.   
The adherence to parochial procedures, the force division on IBRDF 
concepts, the failure to operationalize and share intelligence, and the impact of 
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corruption on building an effective IBRDF team are not unique to Colombia.  To 
varying degrees, every military force deals with these issues.   Overcoming these 
obstacles in the future will require strong leadership from within the armed forces, 
and from the civilian sector. 
 
D. COLOMBIA LESSONS LEARNED 
The intended value of this project goes beyond simply gaining a better 
understanding of Colombia’s situation.  This section draws out essential lessons 
from this one experience that may be transferable for other nations about to 
embark on a transformation journey of their own.  First, leadership played a 
cardinal role in propelling change in both the civilian and military sectors.  Next, 
the existing capabilities of the COLMIL favorably impacted change as well.  
Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, foreign aid played a secondary role to 
those above.  
1. Civilian Leadership 
Colombian forces began true transformation once Uribe assumed office.  
Characterized as both tough and charismatic, he immediately rejected the 
gradual adaptation measures his generals were advocating and demanded 
results.  Concepts of intelligence fusion, mobility, and the like, fit his vision for 
change.  His forceful direction provided both the thrust and vector to force military 
change.  Contributing variables also included winning an election by an 
unprecedented margin, affording him a democratic mandate.  He unquestionably 
remains the central figure in the transformation movement.  However, his cabinet 
members, and the offices they represent, were found to be irrelevant as a force 
for change.  Similarly, congress was also irrelevant in this case study.  They 
remain predicatively disinterested in overseeing military matters, yet they 
generally acquiesced to the increased funding proposals set forth by Uribe.   
To gain an appreciation for the difficult task facing Colombia, in 1986, the 
U.S. Congress legislated law to break parochial traditions within the U.S. military, 
and the today, the current administration is advancing transformation further.  
What was mandated for the U.S. military through Goldwater-Nichols Act, the 
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Colombians military is attempting to electively accomplish; arguably much more 
difficult.  Fortunately, strong leadership is not unique to Colombia.  Once 
introduced to the possibilities for improvement, these leaders may also act as the 
engine for change.  Their role is elevated when combined with a disinterested 
congress and a compliant military.  What matters more than a totalitarian or 
democratic form of government is the formal and informal power the person in 
office yields.  A head of a democratic state may gain by enjoying overwhelming 
support, but can just as easily be crippled by discontented constituents.  
Conversely, a totalitarian leader’s enjoys a consolidation of power, and will be 
less affected by minor fluctuations in public opinion. 
2. Core Competencies   
With the experience of four decades of counterinsurgency fighting, the 
20,000 elite Mobile Brigades and Counterguerrilla Battalions competency made 
Colombia’s transformation effort easier.  To clarify, these forces did not make 
transformation occur, but they made the transformation that did occur much more 
effective.  The larger conscript force lacked necessary training and abilities, and 
were therefore determined irrelevant to change. 
Other nations are unlikely to share the advantage of a disciplined force 
with 40 years experience fighting the same enemy.  These capability deficiencies 
will require three additional ingredients: education, training and time.  The 
amount of each is relative to the specific situation; what is the existing delta 
between the nation’s starting point and the desired capability?  Regardless of 
degree, both officers and enlisted must follow a progression from an introduction 
phase through the employment phase of the new capabilities and concepts.  This 
takes us to the third lesson. 
3. Military Leadership   
Distinctly separate from a military’s core competency, lies the impact of 
military leadership on transformation.  While Colombia’s top commanders did not 
create the vision for fundamental change, they were progressive, competent and 
obedient to civilian rule under Uribe.  Even during the mass resignations during 
the Pastrana peace process, there was not threat of the military circumventing 
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civil authority--resignations were rejected and they returned to work.  The ideal 
case would exist if the head of state and competent military leaders shared a 
vision for transformation.  The next best case, as occurred in Colombia, 
progressive and competent generals are obedient to the head of state’s vision for 
change.  Submission to authority compensates for the lack of initiative for 
change. 
Moving from good to worse situations, eventually nations are faced with 
military leaders who are incompetent and defiant, or competent yet defiant.  In 
either case the head of state must remove replaced these generals until the right 
leader(s) are in place to cultivate the desired transformation.  A cautionary note is 
warranted where cases of competent-yet-defiant generals exist.  The added level 
of difficulty comes in managing the conflicting loyalties between the state and the 
out-going general, thereby adding to the risk of military revolt.  Another negative 
situation includes nations whose military’s are comprised of disparate factions 
under the influence and control of warlords rather than a consolidated military 
loyal to the state.  Such nations add further to the challenges of transformation. 
4. Foreign Aid 
The U.S. has played an supporting role in Colombia’s experience.  The 
vast amounts of U.S. aid were not critical to transformation itself, contrary to 
conventional wisdom.  The United States’ counterdrug aid, such as Plan 
Colombia’s US$1.3 billion, is errantly credited for Colombia’s transformation 
success, when in fact the effects on transformation were secondary at best, and 
counterproductive at worst.  Contributions most applicable to transformation 
included military education and training initiatives that demonstrate the 
efficiencies of IBRDF concepts, and the advantages of joint operations.  The 
types of training are diverse in form and function.  Examples span from purely 
academic, such as that found in U.S. war colleges and noncommissioned officer 
academies, to certification in UN Peacekeeping skills, to special forces 
unconventional tactics.  Accomplished in both the United States and Colombia, 
the interaction allowed COLMIL officers to personalize the IBRDF concepts to fit 
their threat situation and U.S. officers the opportunity to provide objectivity and 
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suggested improvements.  From 1999 through 2003, the U.S. military has 
provided training to over 29,440 Colombian military members (see Figure 5.1 for 
annual breakdown).   The Department of State and Justice have similar initiatives 
that have engaged the CNP and separate ministries to advance the joint and 
interagency interaction.  The moral and psychological support also provided an 
intangible-but-beneficial means of urging transformation.  Transformation has 
occurred despite the fact that the high dollar assets remain restricted from use, 
as in the case of helicopters, or the COLMIL has not yet leveraged their true 
potential, as in the case of high-tech intelligence assets.  Colombia would clearly 
benefit from greater access to helicopter, as they will see improvement as 
intelligence is operationalized more effectively, but at present, their absence has 
not prevented the transformation process. 
The Colombian case illustrates that the most essential element in 
supporting military transformation lies in providing quality education and training 
more so than expensive machinery and technology.  Those elements may 
enhance the process and make the force more lethal, but in the initial stages, the 
critical element requires relatively much less investment. 
 
U.S. Military Training Provided to Colombia 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
2,476 >1,241 6,300 6,477 12,947 >29,441 
Figure 5.1 U.S. Military Training to Colombia; 1999-2003 
(From Reference: Center for International Policy--Colombia Program,  
Foreign Military Training Report). 
 
E. COMMON OBSTICLES TO TRANSFORMATION 
Despite the best efforts of many intelligent professionals, the environment 
and circumstances can undermine progress.  This section demonstrates the 
impact of two fundamental obstacles in Colombia’s transformation efforts that are 
also relevant to other traditional militaries in the developing world.  First, 
corruption is capable of nullifying critical intelligence and destroying trust.  The 
second obstacle arises when both military and police are focused on overlapping 
internal threats, and the complex relationships that exist.   
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1. Corruption   
Colombian officials are engaged on a second front against corruption.  
The IBRDF foundation relies on uncorrupted intelligence to launch surprise 
strikes against the enemy and manipulate the information received by the enemy 
in order to force desired responses.  Whether achieved by high-tech, low-tech 
methods or both, the building of intelligence cases require enormous effort.  One 
corrupt individual can destroy thousands of hours of work, and effect the 
execution of government informants.  The forfeiture of surprise leads to the 
target’s absence or may result in an unexpected ambush.   
Second, corruption is counterproductive to efforts towards jointness.  
President Uribe’s attempts to bridge the staunch CNP-COLMIL rivalry has proven 
an arduous journey.  Occurrences of corruption especially among the CNP as 
well as the potential for ambush, forces are afforded valid reasons not to 
cooperate outside their own service, much less interagency wide.   
This remains a fundamental obstacle for the COLMIL, as with many other 
nations.  While corruption is vulnerable to defeat, lessons on how to effectively 
combat it will have to be found elsewhere.  
2. Internal Cooperation 
Utilizing Colombia’s military forces against internal enemies adds an 
additional layer of difficulty to mere inter-service cooperation.  For decades the 
solution was found in assigning counterdrug missions to the CNP and 
counterterrism missions to the armed services, but ultimately both arms of the 
MOD failed to achieve their purpose; narcotics industry boomed and the FARC 
and AUC followed suit.  While the enemy was exhibiting through efforts 
resembling jointness, government forces remained divided and on its heels.  
Besides the periodic Joint General Staff level planned operations, Colombia’s 
lack of progress disappoints as a solution to overcome this obstacle. 
The phenomenon of internal-only threats is common today, and with it 
comes new challenges regarding joint operations with the police, and 
differentiating between military and law enforcement functions.  In nations that 
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organize their police and military under separate agencies, the issues of 
interagency may be extenuated to an even larger degree.   
 
F. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
U.S. officials are not inclined to support many Plan Colombia-sized efforts.  
Fortunately, the lessons from Colombia support the argument that the IBRDF 
transformation process relies less on large outlays of money, and more 
education and training to model the concept.  Two adjustments in U.S. policy are 
recommended in the case of Colombia, while broad guidance is suggested in 
assisting other nations in such an effort. 
1. Policy with Regard to Colombia 
In keeping with the spirit of transformation, policy recommendations with 
regard to Colombia resist typical financial solutions.  Rather, existing assets 
should be employed with greater efficiencies, and education and training efforts 
should be broadened.  The United States regards Colombia as an ally in both the 
War on Drugs and the War on Terror, yet policies continue to restrict support to 
their counterterrorism war, notably the helicopter assets.  Geographically, 
helicopter assets are crucial to the COLMIL’s rapid mobility.  The nation’s high 
mountain and dense jungle terrain, and the FARC’s exploitation of austere 
mobility corridors, nullify traditional means of transportation.  Even with 
Expanded Authority, U.S. helicopters are effectively made unavailable for use in 
time-sensitive counterterrorist operations due to a lagging approval process.  As 
the professed model of transformation, it is fair to expect the U.S. approval 
process would support the reaction time expected of the Colombians.  Helicopter 
assets will remain under utilized until authorization can be obtained: 1) 
consistently; and 2) within one hour of notification.  Colombians can perform the 
former by knowing what key factors will qualify or disqualify a mission.  Ironically, 
the latter requires U.S. interagency cooperation to resolve. 
The transformation toward IBRDF operations will deepen in proportion to 
its disciples.  U.S. educational and training efforts have had a positive effect on 
those military members exposed to its virtues, but effects can be deepened by 
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proselytizing to a broader audience.  Colombia’s professional civil servants in 
Ministry of Defense positions present a good investment since they will remain 
regardless of election results.  As the reporting authority for both the COLMIL 
and CNP branches, the Ministry of Defense office is intuitively appropriate to not 
only receive expanded training, but also instruct the message and develop their 
own measures of effectiveness to evaluate progress. 
2. Policy with Regard to Other Nations 
Based on what is known about force transformation, the first policy 
recommendation is to issue a warning to policy makers that military 
transformation is a very difficult, long-term process, with an uncertain outcome.  If 
still undeterred, the Colombia model clearly indicates that the single, most critical 
factor for success was the presence of a strong, visionary leader.   
Such reconstruction efforts should only be attempted when the current 
head of state has demonstrated an ability to lead, and retains sufficient 
consolidated power to direct change where necessary.  Foundationally, the 
desire and vision for change must be owned by the leader(s); U.S. invoked 
change is not likely to convert to lasting change.  The governmental type should 
not automatically qualify or disqualify a nation.  Totalitarian governments may 
benefit from the consolidation of power but in democratic Colombia, Uribe was 
able to leverage popular support sufficient to gain congress’ deference despite 
constitutional barriers to consolidated power.   
Since military leadership can greatly enhance reconstruction efforts, 
military-to-military interaction should stress active submission to civilian authority, 
meaning proactively operationalizing the head of state’s vision.  Faced with a 
military establishment opposed to change, attempts should be made to identify 
progressive leaders where progress can be initiated, and from there expanded. 
Forces already possessing core competencies greatly accelerate the 
conversion process.  In such cases, it is necessary that only our most 
experienced personnel are providing instruction, thereby preserving the integrity 
of the IBRDF potential, and ultimately transformation success.  In cases where 
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competency is found lacking, the process will be significantly prolonged as basic 
building block skills are taught first.  In time critical situations where required 
competencies are missing, policy makers should consider greater reliance on 
regional security options, thereby leveraging neighboring competencies to fill a 
short-term void while skills are being acquired. 
Among the most beneficial methods of assisting a developing nation 
refashion their military into IBRDF is through a tailored blending of education and 
training.  In addition to the venues mentioned above, the United States has a 
long history of providing Planning Assistance Teams (PAT) or Military Training 
Teams (MTT) in country.  These members can provide general skills or highly 
specialized training intended for the service counterpart or Special Forces.  The 
emphasis and complexion of the tailored package should be tied directly to the 
force’s competency and specific threat. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
In January 2002, Thomas Marks published a paper accurately entitled, 
“Colombians Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency.”136  Since mid-2002, 
adaptation has become transformation by the enormity and breadth of change, 
led by President Uribe.  By daring to confront foundational concepts governing 
capabilities, people and organization, change was possible.  Colombia 
represents an interesting case for a couple reasons.  First, nations seldom make 
core-level strategic corrections without first suffering a convincing defeat.  
Colombians, and the COLMIL in particular, was under no such impression, yet 
many of its officers and leaders now embrace continued transformational efforts 
after experiencing it for only two years.  Second, history offers few examples of a 
developing nation enduring such change.  Such ambitions are usually reserved 
for wealthier nations and collective security regimes.  Yet, it remains uncertain 
what authors will title their Colombian articles in years 2006, 2010, and beyond.   
Admittedly, Colombia’s national threats go beyond a military nature.   It is 
therefore appropriate that the solution be addressed in broader, grand strategy 
                                            
136 Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency.”  
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measure that address the social, judicial, economic, political and security woes.  
Colombian and U.S. policy makers do view the IBRDF conversion not as a 
panacea but one aspect in a comprehensive strategy.  With regard to this 
singular issue, the findings herein conclude: initiation of Colombia’s IBRDF 
transformation depended on the vision and actions of a few.  After only two years 
of nurturing, its continued existence remains critically dependant on a few.  
Change will become lasting only when the few become many; when culture 
rejects parochialism and embraces joint/interagency operations.  Any conclusion 



























Figure A.1 South America Map 
































Figure A.2 Colombia Map 
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